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**THE GROWTH OF
DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT**

THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

By DELBERT F. BROWN

Author of Which Democratic Government?

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PREFACE

This work stems from my reading, about 1933, Woodrow Wilson's *Constitutional Government in the United States*, a book which minces no words in its analysis of the shortcomings of our presidential government. Many of these shortcomings are dealt with in my previous work, *Which Democratic Government?*, in which I laid the groundwork for the present volume.

For those readers desiring further information on subjects discussed in these pages I should like to recommend certain books and articles that I have found helpful. A very useful history of the second-ballot system appears in *Proportional Representation* by J. H. Humphreys. The story of proportional representation is effectively presented in *Democracy or Anarchy?* by F. A. Hermens. The strengths of political parties in European elections are recorded in *The New International Year Book* for the period from 1919 to 1939. Finland's situation is aptly described in "Finland Takes Stock," an article by Eric Dancy in *Foreign Affairs* of April 1946. The development of ministerial responsibility in Latin America is summarized in "Parliamentary Government in Latin America," by W. S. Stokes, in *The American Political Science Review* of June 1945.

This work has, of course, benefited indirectly by the writings of many political scientists. For obvious reasons, however, it would be impractical to list all of such writings.

Mr. Ollie L. Lewis has read the manuscript and made helpful suggestions toward its improvement.

DELBERT F. BROWN

Richmond, Virginia

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History records many failures in man's attempts to organize democratic government. The correction of the flaws in organization which permitted these disasters to occur has been painfully slow. Too many democracies still die an early death because the lessons of earlier failures have not been learned and the faults have not been corrected. The history of democratic societies is the history of slow progress indeed. There have been three main periods of democratic governments, with their varying successes and failures.

The first period included the early city states before the Christian Era. After nearly two centuries of existence Athens and other Greek city states fell to Philip of Macedon in 338 B. C. The commercial republic of Carthage, after a career of seven centuries, was conquered by Rome in 146 B. C. After nearly five centuries, the Roman Republic in turn was ended by Julius Caesar in 46 B. C. Rome extended citizenship to most of her empire, but none of the early democracies and republics made use of representative government; to the end they ruled their empires from city assemblies.

Failures for much the same reasons occurred during the second period of democracies. Venice elected her first Doge in 697 A. D., but she never developed into anything more than a city state in the eleven centuries before she fell to Napoleon in 1797. Nor did Milan, Florence, Genoa, or the other Italian republics do any better. Frankfort, the seat of many German diets, with local government organized as early as 1193, became a free city in 1311 but failed to extend her early start. Lubeck, with local government from 1151, was declared a free city in 1815, but along with the Hanseatic towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and others in Germany never developed outside their city states before Bismarck ended their independence in 1866.

The third stage saw the beginnings of representative government by Iceland in 930, Aragon (Spain) in 1162, England in 1265, and Poland in 1467 with the organization of legislatures. After 1789, under the leadership of England, France, and the United States, many nations of Europe and Latin America followed with the adoption of

legislatures. The invention of representative government had enabled democracy to outgrow the narrow limits of the city state.

From 1066 onward events in England coordinated to gradually develop representative democracy, and to mold it into cabinet government. Step by step, she brought her king down from an autocrat to a figurehead, and built up her parliament to rule through a cabinet committee. Without a written constitution to hamper her efforts, she developed a model from which all other democracies are copied in some form.

On her islands England was comparatively free from invasion and achieved democratic government after the violent Puritan and the mild Glorious Revolutions. Holland behind her dikes and Switzerland in her mountains achieved their independence after long, hard struggles, but democratic government followed more easily. After suffering her violent Revolution, France failed to organize a successful democratic government and soon lost popular control of her nation to Napoleon. It took all of Europe to deal with him and to restore France to her comparatively harmless Bourbon kings. The growth of democracy in France was thereby delayed for a time.

In 1820, in 1830, and again in 1848, European peoples revolted violently against absolute rulers in their attempts to gain democratic government. Except in France, kings stayed in the saddle but saw their power fade. In some cases, kings were replaced because they resisted the parliament. Much of Europe achieved a measure of democracy soon after 1848, but some monarchs were not stripped of all of their power. In Germany, Wilhelm II was left free to swagger into World War I.

In the Americas, the Thirteen Colonies won their independence in 1783 and attempted to copy the essentials of the English government in the Constitution of 1787. The resulting organization failed to smooth the difficulties which resulted in the Civil War. The Spanish colonies of America won their independence between 1810 and 1819 and Portuguese Brazil won hers in 1824; there followed the establishment of republics patterned after the American Constitution. But these governments, lacking responsible executives, were far from successful. Brazil had her second nation-wide revolution in 1930 after 106 years as kingdom and republic. The rest of the Latin American nations have had several hundred revolutions, with democratic government in operation for varying short periods. Few have yet found their way to successful democracy. For a century the Latin American

nations had a chance to develop a democratic system which would work under the most difficult conditions. But, like Europe, they failed miserably.

After 1918 Europe became, except for Russia, 26 independent democracies. But democracy is a delicate flower which, if not well nourished, dies in the first strong wind. Only 13 of the 26 democracies had survived when World War II began. The other 13, with two-thirds of Europe's population, reverted to autocracy and brought dictatorial Mussolini, Hitler, and World War II. Democracy had apparently failed as a system; it was replaced by dictatorship in many countries.

Democracy reached a high water mark after World War I, then declined until 1944. Since World War II only 15 of the 26 former democracies have been restored. The revival following World War II did not attain the extent of the earlier expansion of 1919. The free nations won the second great war for continued independence; but they failed to secure the peace; they failed to organize the world for democracy on a stable basis.

Since World War II many countries of Asia and Africa have adopted various forms of democratic government. If democracy is to succeed among peoples who have a very low rate of literacy, their statesmen must avoid the errors which have permitted so many western countries to fail. With little experience in popular government, these nations need a foolproof organization to give them the best chances of success. The records of republics in Europe and Latin America offer little hope of success for new democracies.

The successful democracies number only a few today. They include the United Kingdom, the British Commonwealths, a few nations in Western Europe, Turkey, Liberia, the United States, and several Latin American countries. Europe from the first democracy to the 26 after 1919, and the Americas with 21 after 1824, have had more than a century of experience in popular government. Yet the republics continue to falter and fail. Again and again established nations revive democratic government with few changes; too many of them fail to achieve a successful method. New countries adopt systems which have already failed, again and again, in older ones. And still we do not know how to organize democracy so as to give it sound chances of success under all of the conditions which it must face. How many more republics will fail because of faulty organization?

Most of our representative governments have started their careers since 1814. But after more than a century of experience, man has

been so careless of his continued political liberty and so little inquisitive as to his fate that he still does not know the best organization for his government. Students of political science still do not know the answers to the main problems of organization. With two systems of government—namely, the cabinet type used in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the presidential form current in the Americas—it is not yet known which is the more successful method. The American nations elect their presidents by vote of the people, but the countries of Europe and Asia usually elect them by the parliament. The majority system of elections shared the field with the second ballot until 1899. Expanding since then, proportional representation became the generally-used system in Europe after 1918. The most effective method in each phase of organization has still not been determined.

Man advances by gaining from his past experiences. Enough history has now been written that we should know how to organize democracy successfully. The records and histories of governments have been written to be used. It is time that we analyze and compare the records of performance for every type of organization. Then we must eliminate the unsuccessful forms and continue to use only those which have proved successful. The destinies of present democracies and of future ones will be largely decided by the use that statesmen make of past experiences.

We can ill afford to see any more republics fail. If democracy is to hold the ground that it gains, it must be highly developed for maximum effectiveness, efficiency, leadership, and strength. Only by the most effective organization can we preserve our personal freedoms, safeguard democracy from dictatorship and oppression, and prevent another great war.

PART ONE

CABINET GOVERNMENT

2.

ENGLAND ACHIEVES RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

The development of cabinet government in England can be traced clearly from 1265. It was a slow and tedious process of building up the parliament's power, of cutting down the king's control, and of developing a committee to rule for the people. Also, the many practices and procedures which make the cabinet method effective and smooth of operation were added.

The lords wrested the Magna Charta from King John in 1215, thus beginning the decline in the authority of the throne. From its start in 1265, the parliament grew slowly in power. The first ones met as financial assemblies to arrange for the payment of taxes to the crown. Their financial leverage gradually increased their control. The contest for power grew as Charles I steadily refused to share his authority with the parliament. His stubbornness finally resulted in open revolt in 1642 and in his execution seven years later.

As England became a temporary republic, the relation of executive and legislative sections in the new organization continued critical. The assembly was reduced to the one-party Rump Parliament, but it refused to do Cromwell's bidding, and was dissolved in 1653 as he assumed absolute power. The Instrument of Government (1654) failed to bring the orderly election of Cromwell or to make him responsible to the people's delegates. The parliament claimed the right to govern, only to see its meetings dissolved. England had failed to organize a new system of government. The death of Cromwell in 1658 left the young republic to die two years later.

Though the kingdom was restored, the power of the kings continued to decline. The restoration in 1660 brought to the throne Charles II, who had little trouble in governing within increasing limitations on his power. Following him on the throne in 1685, James II would not accept the altered conditions and thereby became the last strong king of England. Dethroned by the revolution of 1688-89, he was replaced

by William and Mary. At last come of age, parliament began to exercise its rule of England through a cabinet committee. The king became a figurehead chief executive remaining on the throne only during his good behavior. Today the crown appoints cabinet members upon recommendation of the leaders of the majority party in the parliament, and signs official documents only with the counter-signature of the prime minister.

By 1714 the more influential members of the Privy Council had become identical with the members of the cabinet and the latter body assumed much of its present position. In 1721 George I, who did not speak English nor attend cabinet meetings, appointed the first recognizable prime minister—Robert Walpole. With his resignation in 1742 on a vote of confidence came the responsibility of the cabinet to the parliament. There followed relatively weak prime ministers ending with Lord North from 1770 to 1782, when George III, through organized control of the House of Commons, ruled briefly. In 1782 came Pitt the Younger and the prime ministership began to attain much of its present dominant position. England had finally achieved cabinet government.

With the electoral reforms of 1832 England's government became more democratic. The control of the dominant House of Lords was broken, with the House of Commons soon becoming the single-chamber parliament as far as power was concerned. It became the governing assembly of the people, executing their will through a committee of its members.

The power of the prime minister and cabinet has grown with the practice of dissolving the House of Commons whenever it fails to support their majority government on a vote of confidence. Once in office, the cabinet requires the assembly to accept its program or, otherwise, to face prompt dissolution followed by an immediate election. Thus, if the parliament fails to support the government on any issue, it can be dissolved with the decision being taken to the people. Otherwise, elections occur after a maximum period of five years, except during wartime when nation-wide contests are not held. This practice of dissolution has developed to the point that cabinets are not defeated by parliaments, but an election is called to determine whether the people approve of the present government, or demand that the party in office be changed. Since 1868 the cabinet has rarely been changed by the parliament, except to form wartime coalitions. Although the House of Commons remains the important assembly of past centuries,

the people and their majority party now choose the prime minister as the head of the government.

Cabinet government does not use one-man rule; the chief executive, whether hereditary or elective, is essentially a figurehead. A committee of the people's elected parliament is the governing authority of the nation. The head of that committee—the prime minister—is not a one-man government; he simply guides committee action. Thus the parliament, by governing through a small group, remains as close as possible to the strength of one-man government. After being appointed to office, these committees must be backed by the parliament or an election results. Power is thus held by a committee of 10 to 15 members. This is as far as authority can be spread, if a government is to retain strength. The system still labors under a handicap similar to the military maxim that "councils of war do not fight." This committee government is very effective except when it tries to avoid war with a Hitler or a Mussolini.

Cabinet government consolidates the personal union of powers—executive, administrative, and legislative—of one-man rule. The cabinet, as a governing unit, decides and carries out the executive and administrative actions of the system. It decides on legislation, and presses for its passage. The parliament fills in the details and enacts the measures requested of it. The assembly supervises the cabinet on its executive decisions and administrative actions. Union of powers in both cabinet and parliament maintains a high degree of co-ordination of executive, administrative, and legislative functions in the system.

Cabinet government can best be thought of as a pyramid. At its base is a majority of the people organized to form a strong party. The second level of the pyramid consists of the majority party representatives in the parliament. The cabinet committee assigned to govern the nation becomes the third step. The capstone represents the hereditary or elected chief executive who signs the instruments of the government. The minority party or parties of the parliament take their places in the structure by criticising any faulty actions of the cabinet. This pyramidal method is the strongest democratic organization that has been developed.

Responsibility in government is a strong characteristic of this organization. The people gravitate into parties to elect their members of parliament. Each member of that body must perform effectively if he wishes re-election. The majority party must carry out efficient administration if it is to appoint the cabinet after the next election.

After choosing its government, the parliament must back it or else face an election. The cabinet must perform effectively if it is to stay in office. Each member must perform well if he is to retain his post. Every act of the figurehead chief executive must be countersigned by the prime minister before it becomes law. The result is responsible government with every member being accountable directly to the group below him. Responsibility is thus carried from the top all the way down to the voters.

Cabinet government has grown into a finely developed instrument of government. It is one of the proudest achievements of man—the nearly perfect government. Its success is limited only by the shortcomings of the statesmen who operate it. But the method is still not used by all nations; even where used, it is seldom well organized.

3.

THE RESPONSIBLE CABINET MEMBER

The origins of ministerial or departmental responsibility reach far back in English history. With the beginning of the parliament in 1265, the ministers of the king appeared in that body to present his plans for taxes. From their appearance in the assembly, eventually came their direct responsibility to the people's delegates. Members of the chamber were appointed to the Privy Council as early as 1407. This action led to the present uniform practice of choosing the cabinet from the parliament. However, an occasional outsider may still be chosen for the government, but he must then win election to the chamber within a reasonable time or resign his position.

For long periods, the parliament had the right to impeach a member of the Privy Council, but the practice was cumbersome and infrequently used. Eventually, ministerial responsibility came into its own when the parliament gained in power in 1688. But, at this point, several attempts were made by the newly powerful assembly to bar the king's ministers from its floor. Had this occurred, cabinet government would probably have been blocked as it was in the United States a century later. Fortunately, these attempts to bar the king's ministers failed, and they gradually became individually accountable to the parliament. Eventually, group responsibility of the ministers was added to their individual accountability to the parliament.

Thus cabinet government places the entire executive unit on the

floor of the legislature, thereby making it available for questioning by the delegates. Under questioning, each administrator who is not performing effectively comes under frequent and heavy criticism. This action forces the shifting of a cabinet member to the position best suited to him. If he is failing seriously, he may be dropped from the committee, with a replacement being brought in. Simply by frequent criticism, the legislature can cause the replacement of any official who is not performing effectively. The committee is forced to sacrifice the faltering member lest the entire group be forced out of office. But the effective member who operates within committee policies has no difficulty in keeping his position. Thus, by direct supervision, the parliament keeps each department headed by a capable man, and keeps each one operating his department satisfactorily.

In order to place responsibility for all actions of the government, the system requires that every activity be kept under the direct authority and administration of a member of the cabinet. In the questioning by the people's delegates on the various activities of the government, any faulty organization is promptly discovered. If a road is not being maintained, an agency giving poor service, or a law not being enforced, prompt questioning results. If the cabinet member so affected states that the matter is under the control of an independent agency, that another department overlaps his, or that the field of activity is not completely under his department, the faulty organization is promptly corrected. Thus the parliament forces the government to organize its entire administrative setup for maximum efficiency, and to keep it so at all times.

A force which works to avoid complex administrative organization is the prevention of partiality in the operation of affairs. By direct questioning of cabinet members, the parliament can keep each one operating his department without political bias as regards business and labor, political parties, races, or other groups. An official, if he wishes to retain his position, must stay within the bounds of party policy and do an impartial job in administering his department. Close supervision makes unnecessary the many bipartisan boards and commissions that would otherwise be necessary.

Thus, by close and frequent supervision of cabinet members, England operates her government at top efficiency. The key to the system is the availability of all members of the cabinet for unhampered questioning by the delegates of the people in the parliament. With a complex operation affecting millions of people, only constant supervision by their delegates can keep each cabinet member operating his

department's affairs in compliance with the people's wishes. This is an operation that the voters cannot handle directly at the polls; they must leave it to their representatives to carry out for them. The efficiency is attended to by their elected delegates, day in and day out, without regard to the next election. This method results in the most direct and efficient administration yet developed by any government.

Under kings power was remote from the people or their representatives. Being out of reach, the throne's actions were arbitrary and could not be regulated. The monarch could be tyrannical in his use of authority, since he was without check or correction by the people. His ministers could be inefficient, ineffective, or corrupt, since they were without control by the people. It was not only the king's tyranny, but also the low ability of most of them, that brought the decline in the power of one monarch after another.

When, in nation after nation, the ministers of the king became responsible to the parliament, a change of considerable importance occurred in the efficiency of these governments. As a committee, the cabinet members became responsible for policies and coordination to the parliament. As individuals, each minister became accountable for the efficient and effective operation of his department. Each one could be questioned by the people's representatives for his every decision, and for every action of his subordinates. Government had become accountable to the people at the departmental level. Irresponsible one-man rule had been replaced by responsible committee government as to policies, and by accountable departmental operation as to efficiency and effectiveness.

History still records the beginning of responsible government as the bringing of the king's ministers into the parliament, and then of making them accountable to that body. If the title of minister is disregarded, we find that the permanent head of each department no longer answers to the king, but is supervised by a member of the cabinet. The department head, who formerly appeared in parliament to present the king's plans, now appears only at the elbow of a cabinet member when giving information in a technical debate. The permanent department heads who were called ministers, even lost their titles to the cabinet members. The term "ministerial responsibility" covering accountability of all government employees to the parliament is incorrect. The term would be more realistic if called "departmental responsibility."

Ministerial or departmental responsibility and local administration are two features that are required in organizing a system which will

adjust to the people. All nations must have local units that will readily adapt themselves to each locality. All countries of any size also require provincial units for the same purpose. But the departments of a national government have only the questioning of their heads by the local delegates in the legislature to accomplish this adjustment. Unlike a large and dispersed business organization, there is no competition to force adaptation to local conditions. A department, such as the postoffice which reaches every citizen in the nation, requires the supervision of its head by their representatives, in order to operate efficiently and effectively in every locality in the country.

This supervision of department heads by parliaments is spreading slowly and steadily around the world. Only seven usually democratic countries bar cabinet members from their legislatures. These nations include Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Liberia, Paraguay, the Philippines, Uruguay, and the United States. Five Latin American countries permit department heads to appear on the floor of their congresses, while ten others require them to appear for questioning. Responsible departmental government is gradually becoming universal.

4.

THE RESPONSIBLE SINGLE REPRESENTATIVE

In her early parliaments, England used two-seat constituencies, with each shire represented by two knights, each borough by two burgesses, and each city by two citizens. However, with the electoral reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884 the two-seat constituencies were largely eliminated. With the resulting single-seat constituency, each member became responsible to a block of citizens in a limited geographical area. Each voter helps to elect only one representative and can look to him for attention to his needs. Thus England made every member of the parliament responsible to the people, as it had already made the throne, the cabinet, and its ministers. Except for minor details, the development of responsible government was complete.

To the voters in the single-member constituency goes maximum control of their representatives, which is required in order to exert reasonable control of their parties. Those organizations, in order to play their full parts in operating governments, need to be strongly organized, with many factors making them powerful. Centralized party finances, the expense of elections, the desire of many legislators for

lifetime political careers, the practice of candidates standing for office anywhere in the country, and the dissolution of the parliament when the cabinet falls make legislators subject to control by party leaders. Only the single-member constituency, with majority elections, prevents the parties from becoming too powerful and losing responsibility to the voters.

When a party attempts to purge itself of dissenting members of a legislature, the voters can overrule their leaders and prevent this from being carried out. A case of this occurred in the United States when President Roosevelt attempted to purge the congress of members who had defeated the measure to pack the Supreme Court in 1937. The voters overruled their leader and returned all but one of the dissenting members to office. Thus the voters backed up their representatives and made local influence on the party effective in preventing too much control by their leader.

In the single-member constituency, the governing majority party has little chance to falsify the election results so as to remain in power. The leading parties observe the elections from the polls to the collection point for the constituency. With the tabulation of the votes being a strictly local matter under close supervision of all parties, the people can feel confident that their votes are correctly handled by their local committees.

Also important is the short ballot. With its use, the voters have only to elect one representative to the national parliament, one delegate to the provincial legislature, one councilman to the local government, and possibly two or three other local officials. In the case of the two-chamber parliament, the citizens must elect a member to each of those assemblies. With only a very small percentage of the voters taking the time to keep themselves fully informed on political affairs, elections are thus reduced to a minimum effort for them. The short ballot brings before the people a minimum number of candidates; yet it includes all of the essential officials which they need to elect in order to control the government.

The voters have only their collective public opinion and their tenuously controlled local party committees to act for them in placing candidates in elections. If these local units are to have maximum responsibility to the voters, they must cover only a minimum geographical area. The size of the parliament plays its part in this requirement. The more seats there are in the assembly, the smaller is the constituency of each member and the more direct influence the voters have on him and on the government. The smaller the constituency, the more citi-

zens know the members of their local party committee—their basic organization. By establishing these small constituencies, the lower chambers of the parliaments of England and France have over 600 seats, while those of Germany (Weimar) and Italy have almost that number.

An election campaign is a very expensive affair, with candidacy being, all too often, left to the well to do. The average citizen is usually barred from entering the contests because of the expense entailed. With the campaign for each seat in the legislature being a single contest in as small a geographical area as practicable, expenses, especially travelling costs, are kept to a minimum. The campaign expenses of each candidate are limited and closely supervised, to supposedly prevent a too liberal use of money. From the dissolution of the parliament to the election is usually three or four weeks, thereby keeping the campaign very short and as inexpensive as possible. By these practices, the contest for each seat is left as available as possible, despite heavy financial odds, to the average citizen seeking a political career.

The lack of a residence requirement in England permits the placing of candidates to best advantage. Whenever there are too many nominees for a seat, the surplus is available for contests in other places. When a good candidate is not available in a constituency, then an outsider may be called in for the nomination. With a many-seated parliament and no residence requirement where nominated, a place is usually available for any citizen seeking a political career. Thus the supply of candidates can be adjusted to the demand for them.

During the life of a parliament, which in England has a peace-time maximum term of five years, but during the period ending with World War II reached ten years, death and retirement take their toll of the membership. The bye-elections to fill these seats give the leader of each party a reasonably good idea of how his party is meeting the desires of the voters. The majority contest for each single seat gives a clear contest for and against the government, thus making the trend of public opinion fairly clear. Also, openings are always available for leaders defeated in the general elections, and for essential men after appointment to cabinet positions. Thus the single-member bye-elections play an important part in the life of the parliament.

With a majority of votes needed to win each single seat, the contest places a minimum requirement on the candidates for office. Each one of them must be able to speak to the public and to answer their questions at political meetings. Each contestant must put on a fighting

campaign against all other opponents. Though the national party leaders may influence the placing of candidates in the constituencies, they must select ones who are capable of facing the voters. Thus the contest of several candidates for a single seat forces the parties to select worthy nominees. Though the minimum requirements may not be high; they are there; and they must be met.

A many-seated parliament with resulting small constituencies, cuts the possibilities of gerrymandering sure seats for a party to a minimum. In turn this promotes a maximum proportion of closely-contested constituencies with their strong nominations. The 40 or 50 party leaders of ability and experience are placed for safe seats, where each one's party is sure to win. Left are relatively few constituencies where weak candidates may be nominated without endangering their party's chances to win an election.

It is largely agreed that unless a candidate be very weak and the vote in a constituency be close, it will be the party which wins and not the individual. Thus, if contestants all be fairly satisfactory, an individual candidate decides the election in but few constituencies. It is the party which wins or loses the contest. As far as the membership of the legislature is concerned, that is largely decided in the pre-election nominations. At this point the power of the people must be effective if the membership of the assembly is to be adequate. It is here that the collective will of the voters in single-member constituencies becomes effective in forcing good nominations for election to the legislature.

5.

DEVELOPING A LEADERSHIP CORPS

The requirements of the single-member contests heavily decide the membership of the legislature. The nominations are thereby decisive in choosing the personnel of the parliament from whom future leaders will advance to the head of the nation. Every phase of the nominations and elections is important as it affects the choice of the members of parliament, thus determining the material becoming available to furnish future leaders.

The process of majority elections is a form of "the selection of the fittest" for high public office. The strongest requirement of these campaigns is the fighting courage needed to enter a man-to-man contest against heavy odds on the side of the holder of the office. Young

men are always fighting for a place in the legislature; some of them usually succeed. New blood is constantly being infused into the parliament to become the future leaders. From the winners of these contests, which call for a good fight, come men who lead their countries through all their trials.

The vitality of the parties and of their delegates in the legislature is maintained by these contests. This is extremely important because seniority plays a large part in determining the membership of the legislature with a member, once in office, tending to remain there for years. But he must fight for his seat in every election against all comers who try for a parliamentary career. To maintain his place, each member must keep his views in line with advancing political ideas and party platforms or, sooner or later, he will be defeated. Thus the system keeps men of long experience in the parliament but prevents them from falling behind advancing political and economic ideas. But whenever a member is no longer satisfactory to the voters, he can be replaced by a younger or abler man. A virile membership of parliament is maintained; a too elderly membership is avoided.

In choosing personnel for high office, cabinet government has developed several practices which make the process as effective as possible. Most important is the line of promotion from parliament to cabinet to prime ministership. A member must show ability in the assembly before he can enter the cabinet. He must show outstanding ability in cabinet posts before he can reach the prime ministership. Any man of better than average ability has an excellent chance of promotion if his party comes to power.

Since the choice of leaders is by promotion in the parliament, military men take very little part in high office. The cases of Generals Botha, Herzog, and Smuts who became prime ministers of the Union of South Africa are extremely unusual. However, in office, they proved to be as able political leaders as they had been military ones.

The parliament differentiates between peacetime and wartime leaders. The former is a man of considerable ability and of long experience in the parliament. His usual qualification is his ability to conciliate minorities and to coordinate the dull routine of peacetime government. In contrast, the wartime leader is a man of outstanding ability, capable of forming and executing enormous plans, and having the tremendous energy needed to carry them out. After hostilities have begun, the peacetime leader usually gives way to the wartime leader who drives his nation to maximum effort. Wars could not be as effectively fought without the leadership of the Georges

Clemenceaus, the William Pitts, the Lloyd Georges, and the Winston Churchills. Soon after a conflict ends, an election usually sends him back to his place on the sidelines in parliament. He is usually kept in reserve under training for wartime duty, but he might run his nation amuck in peacetime.

Almost as important is the continual testing of statesmen under action of operating the government. After promotion to the prime ministership and the cabinet posts, statesmen must deliver a satisfactory performance in order to retain office. Failure in action is followed by a shift to a less strenuous position or by being dropped from the cabinet. Thus the system continually checks on the performance of statesmen in office, and brings transfers or replacements when needed.

The opposition has no such system available for choosing leaders. It has to depend on former cabinet members, if any, with only debate and committee work to develop new prospective leaders.

With a clear line of promotion, the prime minister and cabinet members are well trained for their posts before taking office. This results because a member must usually serve about ten years in the legislature before reaching the cabinet; he must serve a much longer period in parliament and cabinet before becoming prime minister. With day-to-day experience in the assembly for years, seeing the cabinet in action at close range, a statesman is as well pre-trained for his post as it is possible for him to be.

After promotion, development, training, and success in action, statesman are kept in the parliament as long as they wish to stay. This is possible under the practice of permitting a candidate to stand for office anywhere in the country. Such flexibility permits each party to place its leaders in "safe constituencies"—those where the organization is reasonably sure of winning. However, if a party suffers a severe defeat with one of its leaders being defeated, he soon stands for office in a bye-election to fill a vacant seat in a still safer district. An able man, after having entered the parliament and proven his ability, is given a lifetime job there.

From the parliament, able men are promoted to the leadership of the nation. The system is extremely selective in the choice of leaders; it is thorough in giving them full training before taking office; it places the right man on each post as consistently as possible. The system produces able and trained statesmen for any duty that they may be called upon to perform.

Between all parties, each nation has a "leadership corps" of 40 to 50 men in its parliament. These are the lifetime members who fill

most of the cabinet positions; lead most of the committees; carry the debate on the floor; train the new members; and frequently address the public. These men know their government as veterans and experts who have seen practically every action of it for years. Regardless of which party holds office, these are the veterans who carry out the policies of their government, and who lead the opposition.

A nation's foreign affairs can be given expert handling by the "leadership corps." For years its members have followed at first hand their country's relationships with other nations as it cooperates with them, or opposes their policies. Under constant supervision by the parliament, long-term policies and their details are effectively applied. The "leadership corps" will take a broad, long-term policy in foreign affairs, as dictated by their nation's ideals and position in the world, and keep that course for years with only minor deviations. This is the machinery which creates a foreign policy; then carries it out in the day-to-day relations with other countries.

Until recently the democracies had to counter autocracies with imperialistic policies of their own. Most foreign offices had the reputation of making war for the extension of their nations' territories. However, with the passing of the autocracies in World War I, the trend has been changing rapidly.

Leading foreign policy now seeks the extension of democracy and peace. To carry out this aim, cabinet governments have the veteran statesmen to handle their foreign affairs on a long-term basis so as to assure, if possible, a world of peace. Though the Neville Chamberlains occasionally fail, statesmen will eventually bring a peaceful world.

PART TWO

MAJORITY-SYSTEM PARLIAMENTS

6.

THE MAJORITY SYSTEM

Although the beginnings of England's political parties can be traced farther back in history, their careers are considered as continuous from the reign of Charles II (1660-85). With his restoration came reaction resulting in the measures known as the Clarendon Code (1661-65), which limited the holding of high office to members of the Church of England. The two-party system followed with the Tories being closely associated with the Anglican Church, while the Whigs were associated with the non-conforming Protestant churches. Although Acts of Toleration for the office-holding non-conforming Protestants were passed yearly after 1689, it was not until 1821 that the religious issue was removed from politics. The Clarendon Code had played a big part in promoting a two-party system. And, continuously, from the rise of the parliament, the majority system of elections tended to divide the voters into a majority or governing party and a strong opposition party.

As suffrage was gradually extended in 1832, 1867, and 1884, the newly enfranchised voters took their places in the old organizations. Although new issues came to the forefront, the two-party system has continued with only short three-party interruptions.

With the reduction of monarchs to figureheads, the power that once resided in kings is now vested in political parties. In nearly all countries, whether wholly democratic or not, the people go to the polls and empower the leaders of one or more political parties to act for them. These organizations give votes collective strength. The parties mobilize the people into organizations which nominate and elect their candidates, and transmit to the winners the power and the backing needed to govern. The officials in turn use the organizations to maintain continued support. Although they occupy but scant place in constitutions, parties are just as vital a force in governments as is any other section.

Majority rule in the most successful democracies has come to mean majority-party rule. A majority of the people gravitate into an organization broad enough to represent their combined aims and interests. The majority organization develops a program and instructs its representatives in the legislature to carry it out. Its policies are put into operation in the government, and majority rule thereby becomes effective.

But when the people do not unite into a party broad enough to achieve a majority in the legislature, then weakness develops. Two or more parties, after being elected to a parliament on the basis of their differences, must compose those differences and form a coalition cabinet. But a minimum of action can be taken, since many measures would compromise the various parties in the eyes of the citizens who gave them specific instructions at the last election and, in the next one, will vote on their record in carrying out their wishes. Thus a coalition cabinet can take less action than a majority-party cabinet can. The more small factions there are in a coalition cabinet, the less action it can take. In some cases, so little governing is accomplished that a near stalemate in the government's affairs results. From the first one-party cabinet in 1693, England has, with few lapses, avoided coalitions except during wartime. Even when a majority party is not available, England sticks to a one-party cabinet as was the case of the Labor government of 1923.

Electoral systems and practices translate the people's votes into power in the parliament. Only when a majority party is consistently produced in the parliament can an electoral system be regarded as fully successful. While failing to achieve a majority result, if the voting method produces a leading organization with 40 per cent or more of the seats, then a fairly satisfactory two-party coalition can be arranged. But if the leading organization drops below 40 per cent of the seats with resulting three- or four-party coalitions, then the government becomes critically weak. In many nations the survival of the government hangs on the method of election, as it determines the size of the leading party and usually fails to deliver a majority organization into the parliament.

In addition to electing a majority party to govern, the successful electoral system must maintain an opposition strong enough to win an election when the governing party fails in its conduct of the government. After periods of 15 to 20 years, a party in power tends to become devitalized. Its leaders grow old and need to be replaced by younger, vigorous men. It fails to move left or right as the people

wish, and its replacement becomes necessary to progressive government. And always, the voters judge the organization in power on its success. Whenever a governing party fails, its loss of office should be sure at the next election. Only if the people can replace their governing organization, can it be considered as responsible to them. Only a two-party system can be assured of accomplishing a governing majority organization and an alternate, thus giving the people's votes maximum effectiveness.

Under the majority system, each seat in the parliament is won in a contest of individuals. Candidates must compete for each single seat with only a majority or a plurality vote bringing victory. There can be only one winner. The runner-up has only the hope of doing better in the next election. All other candidates fare badly. This single-winner result has the effect of strenuously limiting the number of candidates for each seat in the parliament.

Another limiting feature in England is a campaign deposit of 150 pounds which is forfeited if a candidate receives less than one-eighth of the votes in the election. The planned effect is the limiting of the campaign for most seats to a maximum of two candidates. This practice serves to limit contests to a clear result, either for the government, or against it. Criticized as preventing able men from entering politics, this method is compensated by the practice of making constituencies available for able persons seeking office, and of placing them where they will have reasonably good chances of winning.

The over-all result limits severely the number of parties contesting an election in each constituency. In England's parliament of 600-odd seats, the usual three-way campaign sees about 100 seats uncontested because the result is not in doubt; weaker organizations would waste effort and money in these areas. For about 500 seats, there are two-way races. These result from agreement by the two weaker parties in each constituency on the seats which each will contest. Three-way races would only split the opposition vote between the two weaker parties thus preventing the election of either one. For about 50 seats there are three-way races with each organization feeling that it has a reasonable chance to win. Thus a three-party campaign results in three-way races for only a few seats.

Limiting the number of parties locally brings a similar result nationally. In the average election, the leading party wins between 40 and 45 per cent of the seats by a majority vote. In addition, it takes about 10 per cent more by a plurality vote. Between majority and plurality seats, the leading party usually wins a majority in the legis-

lature. Limiting the number of candidates locally, helps to produce the desired result of a majority party to rule.

The second-strength party wins its strong minority of seats in constituencies where its support is heaviest. But, unless it can consolidate all of the opposition elements into one organization, it has little chance of capturing a majority of seats and of organizing its government. The second-strength party has the problem of advocating a program of change in order to win an election, but at the same time of avoiding a narrow platform that will split off elements into separate organizations.

All other parties fare badly, so badly in fact, that they are wasting their time and money in even entering the campaign, except in the few constituencies where they have enough support to win an occasional seat. This difficulty of small parties becomes very important in the near elimination of the extremists which win only 1 or 2 per cent of the votes nationally. Rarely do they even win a seat in a legislature. Even those citizens desiring to vote for the extremists seldom do so because they would have little or no chance of electing their first choice candidates. The extremists face only a campaign with no victory possible, and with the loss of time and money spent in the contest. Countries using the majority system do not even need to outlaw the Communist and Fascist organizations, since they cannot win seats in the parliaments anyway. It is only necessary to keep a check on their activities.

The simple feature of a contest of candidates for each seat in the legislature, with only a majority or a plurality vote winning, brings important results. Only two strong parties are likely. Third parties have a short and difficult career. The cabinet asks for a majority in the coming election and usually receives it. Only if the opposition is strongly organized can the cabinet eventually be named by it. The system results in strong parties and in stable government.

This electoral method is sometimes called the plurality system. This is done because not all of the seats are won by a majority vote; there being some of them taken by a plurality vote. But even then, at least three-fourths of the places are usually won by a majority vote. With the purpose of the system being to produce a majority party to govern, this is accomplished nearly all of the time. Even when a majority result is not achieved, the minority parties cooperate in governing the country, because every member of the parliament was chosen by a majority or plurality vote and wishes re-election. By the

successful achievement of strong parties to govern nations, the method is correctly called the majority system.

7.

IRREGULARITIES OF THE MAJORITY SYSTEM

Year in and year out, the majority system produces strong parties to govern nations, develops oppositions to supervise the governments, and elects promising candidates to parliaments for development into able leaders. Its successful operation is seldom praised; but its many irregularities are roundly criticized. The weight of these criticisms has brought many deviations in the system and has stimulated the development of other methods of election. But the remedies seek to correct highly publicized, but only superficial irregularities. The remedies bring worse difficulties in their wake. We need, therefore, to examine the vagaries of the majority system which should be better understood.

The mildest criticism, and the least heard, is the close similarity of parties to each other. It is thought that there is not enough difference between the parties to make a campaign interesting to the voters. Frequently, elections are held with little at stake except that the "Ins" wish to remain in power while the "Outs" desire to replace them. The organization in office continues there through election after election until it is replaced, not because of the difference between the parties, but mainly because the voters desire a change. This lack of marked difference between parties is brought about by the mechanics of the system.

The necessity for achieving a majority or a plurality of votes in order to win each seat reduces the differences between parties. In order to achieve a majority of ballots, each party, while taking its stand to the right or to the left, must also appeal to the moderates in the center. The result is a campaign between center parties, with the platform of each one including a plank or two, to the left or to the right. Although selected organizations may be named: conservative, liberal, and socialist; they may only correctly be called: conservative center, liberal center, and socialist center, respectively. The process of majority elections results in left-center, center, and right-center parties, regardless of the names used.

In the usual election campaign, regardless of which party succeeds, the moderates in the center always win. No matter which party suc-

ceeds, the moderates cast the deciding votes which bring victory. The center can say to the extremes, "We are going to win every election. If our right-center party does not win, then our left-center one will. Heads we win; tails you lose." The result is the election of two or more moderate parties.

Since running a government calls for a high degree of cooperation between parties, this is readily achieved. The operation of the government is carried out easily and effectively no matter which party rules. The many varying results of the system, though they draw criticism, are the mild price that must be paid for always electing the moderates to office.

The method works well when only two parties enter candidates in a campaign, since this usually results in a majority of both votes (nationally) and of seats going to one of them. When the two parties are of nearly equal strength, the resulting number of seats is usually in close proportion to the votes received by each one nationally. But in practice these ideal proportions do not always occur, and many variations result.

There is no provision for preventing the number of seats won from exceeding the percentage of votes received by the leading organization. It is theoretically possible for one party with 51 per cent of the ballots, evenly placed across the country, to obtain 100 per cent of the seats in a legislature. In practice, the leading party often wins more seats than its proportion of ballots would indicate. This was the case in the British election of December 1918 when the coalition government of Lloyd George with 5,100,000 votes won 472 seats in the House of Commons, while the opposition with 4,600,000 received only 203, of which 73 Irish seats were not occupied. The leading party, with 52 per cent of the ballots, had received 68 per cent of the seats. Practically every country has seen this condition occur at times. But a too large majority loses cohesion, with the minority receiving assistance from its members. Since no party, with such a too-large seating in the legislature of a democracy, has yet taken advantage of this condition to interfere with minority ones, it cannot be regarded very seriously.

The heavy landslide defeat of a party brings about an important result. With the trend of political ideas toward the liberal, socialist, and welfare ideals, a conservative party has to be constantly liberalizing its platform. But sometimes it falls behind popular demands and, consequently, loses office. If it then suffers a landslide defeat, it can recover more quickly than would otherwise be possible. Such

a result followed the 1936 landslide defeat of the Republicans in the United States when its membership in the House of Representatives was reduced to 89 seats. This thorough house cleaning of the "Old Guard" enabled the party to bring in new and younger men as it regained seats in following elections; made it easier to modernize its policies and aims. In 1952 the party won control of the presidency and the congress. The landslide defeat of 1936 had enabled the Republicans to recover in a reasonably short time.

There is no provision for assuring a party which has received a small majority of votes nationally of always receiving a majority of seats. This difficulty occurred in the election of 1886 in England when the Liberals under Gladstone received a slight majority of ballots, but the opposition captured a majority of 118 seats in the House of Commons. This condition very seldom occurs since few elections are close enough for it to happen often. Usually of short duration, the lopsidedness ends with the next election after having caused no serious results.

Another case was the 1951 election in England in which the Labourites won 48.7 per cent of the votes, but the Conservatives with 48 per cent took a majority of 16 seats in the House of Commons. This apparent failure of the election in allowing a party to win a majority of seats, in spite of the fact that another one had received more ballots, is not as serious as would seem at first glance. The only marked difference between the Conservatives and the Labourites in this election was that Labour had nationalized steel and truck transportation, while the Conservatives wished to restore them to private ownership. Except for this issue, both organizations are center ones. No matter which party won, the moderates had achieved another victory. The result of the election caused little adverse comment among England's voters.

With three or more parties placing candidates in a contest, the resulting number of legislative seats won by each one may be still farther out of line with their votes. In England this factor delayed the rise of the Labour party; it slowed the decline and death of the Liberals. But the use of the power of the prime minister to dissolve a parliament, consolidates and enlarges the leading organizations to the point where a two-party system soon returns, along with satisfactory representation. Full use of this practice is needed to limit the number of parties and to avoid this poor representative result.

A similar condition develops as seats in a legislature fail to be correctly apportioned according to population. With the shift of people from country to city, some constituencies of a nation become over-

represented while others become under-represented. In the United States in 1946, the 5th congressional district of Illinois had a population of 112,000, while the 7th had a population of 914,000. Since parties are fearful that the changing of representation may lose seats for them in the resulting congress, they do not easily alter the boundaries of constituencies. The apportionment of seats in the congress by states has been made automatic; but within many states, it remains poorly distributed according to population. A fully automatic system of re-apportionment after each census is badly needed but does not seem likely to develop.

When a party has in its midst a small section where an opposing party usually holds a majority, the practice of "gerrymandering" is used. This is the practice of splitting up the section, then including it in the surrounding constituencies, so that the small area does not have a chance of electing its party candidate. Instead of the small section being in a single constituency and able to elect its party candidate, its votes are split up and always smothered by opposition ballots in the surrounding territory. The 600-member parliaments of the large nations of Europe result in small constituencies which are much more difficult to gerrymander, than are the large congressional districts resulting from the 435 seats in the House of Representatives of the United States. Gerrymandering and incorrect apportionment, though for years resulting in inaccurate representation in legislatures, finally become bad enough so as to force their correction.

In the meantime, under-representation from poor apportionment and gerrymandering has few ill effects, since it is offset by several factors. First, under-representation of a party in one or more constituencies is partially offset by the opposite condition elsewhere in the country. Second, the citizens who have a condition to be corrected go to the polls in such large numbers as to force the government to act to satisfy them anyway. And third, since all laws, to be constitutional, must have equal coverage throughout the nation, the under-represented citizens cannot usually be discriminated against. Despite all the publicity, poor apportionment and gerrymandering benefit some politicians but do not penalize the under-represented citizens to any marked extent.

General elections are preceded in the United States by primaries in an unsuccessful attempt to give the people control of the nominations, but this practice has not been followed elsewhere. In Europe until 1918, a second ballot, or runoff, was usually held between the two leading candidates in the constituencies in which no one had received

a majority of the votes in the first contest. More than a dozen countries used this deviation on the majority system, but found it wanting in effectiveness and discontinued it.

The majority system is used generally in Latin America but without responsible government; while responsible government is used in Continental Europe without the majority system. Both combinations fail dismally. The majority system remains the simplest and strongest method of producing legislatures capable of ruling nations effectively and efficiently.

8.

BUFFERS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT

Though England developed cabinet government rapidly after the first recognizable prime minister took office in 1721, it was not a democratic system. Property restrictions on suffrage, dating from 1429, were so rigorous that less than a half million propertied citizens could vote. The parliament became increasingly corrupt. The throne, having exercised little power for over three-quarters of a century, regained control in the hands of George III from 1770 to 1782. His arbitrary acts hastened the loss of the thirteen American Colonies. The parliament regained power in 1782. With the electoral reforms of 1832 enough citizens gained the franchise, so as to transfer control of the government from the aristocratic class to the middle class, thus bringing about a fairly democratic assembly.

In addition to the limited number of voters was the hereditary and, therefore, non-democratic upper chamber of the parliament. The House of Lords, with its hereditary membership, vetoed all actions of the House of Commons which tended toward more popular government. But if the king were to give the prime minister the power to appoint new members to the upper chamber, that body would cease to block the measure at issue. This method was used to pass the Reform Bill of 1832. The power of the House of Lords was broken; the House of Commons was well on its way toward becoming the governing assembly of England.

With the progress of the Industrial Revolution, people piled into the urban centers of England, but apportionment was not changed for many decades. By 1832 the House of Commons included 143 seats which were elected by only a handful of voters. These seats were easily controlled by the ruling clique. In a Commons of 658 members,

this condition gave the governing group considerable control in the assembly. Re-assignment of the 143 seats in 1832 made a good start toward better apportionment, and toward making the Commons more truly representative of the people's will.

The Reform Bill of 1832 was the opening that brought widespread voting and democracy to England. As the population has concentrated in the urban centers, apportionment has been adjusted accordingly. The declining power of the House of Lords was finally reduced in 1911 to a two-year delay on measures of the House of Commons. Though the Reform Bill had doubled the number of voters, they still included less than a million citizens. The franchise was widened again in 1867, and again in 1884. Finally, universal manhood suffrage came in 1918, and universal adult suffrage in 1928. Thus England had finally achieved the universal vote.

The delay in granting a widespread franchise may have cost England the loss of Ireland. The parliament which covered the British Isles, after the inclusion of Ireland in 1801, was a far from democratic body. The franchise included less than 5 per cent of men to 1832, less than 10 per cent to 1867, when it was greatly increased. With the widening suffrage came the increasingly democratic actions of the government. But the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland in 1869 and the Land Act of 1881 came far too late. A democratic parliament in 1801 might have held Irish loyalty and retained the unity of the British Isles; but a democratic Commons in 1867 was not in time to satisfy Irish needs. Thus delayed democracy played a part in the loss of Ireland by England.

Fading after 1832 were England's efforts to organize a government that, while curbing her rulers, would yet keep that regime in the hands of the large property owners. Ended were the limited suffrage, the grossly unequal votes, and the power of the limiting upper chamber of the parliament. All that now stood between the rights of property owners and severe regulation, and even eventual forced sale to national ownership, were the excellent qualities of the government that their forbears had helped to organize. On its moderation they would depend heavily for a few decades, until heavy taxation began during World War II, and government ownership began in earnest after the Labour party's victory of 1945.

A leading characteristic of the system is the short legislative lag of the parliament. With the cabinet members being subject to questioning by the representatives, most inadequacies of administration are promptly brought out and corrected. With the parties wishing to be

re-elected, the wishes of the people receive early attention. This prevents a heavy backlog of dissatisfaction from building up. With the people's major complaints taken care of, there remain only a collection of minor ones but these do not furnish material for a campaign to overthrow the vested interest's apple cart.

Another characteristic of cabinet government is the solidarity of its majority backing. With the party's members of parliament being held to support the government by the possibility of a dissolution of the assembly, the delegates are not subject to individual purge by the voters. The people, if wishing to reprimand the government for any action, must defeat the majority party at the polls. But unless their representatives in the parliament bring down the cabinet, the people are not given a chance to replace the government. This opportunity is seldom given the voters, because their delegates, being in close contact with the affairs of the government, do not pass any issue to the public under condition of crisis unless absolutely necessary.

When the government finds it necessary to take drastic economic, financial, or defense measures, it can act under this condition. The opposition realizes that it might be able to force an election on the issue; but if it won the contest and took office, it—the former opposition—would almost certainly have to take nearly identical action to that which it had just defeated. Forcing an election on the legislation at issue is, in such circumstances, obviously unwise. The opposition assures moderation on the measure, with early action being taken to meet the needs of the crisis effectively. Peacetime measures, such as universal military training, can be passed. Taxes are raised as necessary to take care of the government's expenses. Tariffs can be adjusted to the needs of the nation's economy. Stringent financial and economic actions are taken to handle any peacetime difficulty that occurs.

During wartime, rationing and extreme control actions can be taken. During World War II, under the stress of a nation fighting against tremendous odds, England was obliged to adopt defense measures to match her foes. The draft for national service was extended to include women as well as men, and many civil rights were suspended for the duration of hostilities. The people were permitted the food, clothing, and housing needed to carry on defense and essential activities, but little else was allowed them. England could fight a total war, and play her maximum part in the winning of the conflict.

Such are the buffers which make up an efficient cushion effect between the people and their government. This organization permits the taking of prompt and effective action needed to meet any crisis.

The government may even override adverse public opinion. The cabinet, always kept under close supervision by the people's delegates, takes the needed action. It attempts to keep the public informed on its progress so that they will back the government. The people respond with their support, bitter as the pill may sometimes be.

When handling the expenditure of public funds, another practice protects the government from pressure groups and assures sound financial policies. Since 1706 the "self-sustaining ordinance" has restricted to members of the English cabinet the privilege of proposing measures appropriating public funds. Other members of the parliament may not propose an expenditure, nor an increase in one. They may only move to decrease a proposed expenditure. Thus, only the cabinet, operating under supervision of the parliament, may propose the expenditure of public funds. This is an extremely important factor in payments to individuals.

Under developing modern industrial and economic systems, payments from public treasuries to individuals are becoming of increasing importance. Social welfare programs are placing a growing proportion of voters on payments from treasuries. Expanding services are increasing the number of employees at a fast rate. Each war places a large number of claimants and dependents on veteran's pensions. Employees' salaries, veterans' benefits, old age pensions, unemployed benefits, and other payments to individuals are placing such a high proportion of voters on public funds, that they threaten financial solvency. Only maximum control of finances can prevent bankruptcy from this source alone.

The effectiveness of the cabinet's control of spending can be seen in the comparative ease with which all cabinet governments maintain balanced budgets, where payments to individuals are concerned. So far, their financial troubles have been caused by wars and economic difficulties. Payments of various kinds to citizens show no signs of getting out of hand. Only such control can maintain the balance between the government's financial position, and the salaries of employees, and benefits to veterans and other deserving citizens.

9.

PARLIAMENT DELEGATES ADEQUATE POWER

The parliament delegates maximum power, under control and supervision, to the cabinet. The legislature's primary operation is the

choosing, the supervising, and the replacing of the governing committee. Having accepted the cabinet after an election, the parliament must give it a comparatively free hand on its proposed actions. This results in nearly all of the cabinet's program being enacted into law.

The procedure of doing business in a parliament places major action on legislation at the beginning of its consideration. On its first reading, a measure is ordered printed, and is placed on the calendar for second reading and debate. With its second reading the measure receives its major action. It is considered on its principles, not its details. If rejected, that is the end of it for the session. If accepted, the measure proceeds to committee for drafting. It then returns to the floor of the parliament for its third reading, at which time debate in detail occurs, followed by final passage. However, if further changes are made, the measure returns to committee for redrafting and smoothing out. It then returns to the floor for a fourth reading, which includes minor debate and final passage.

Legislative action of the upper house is practically all in the line of concurring with the lower chamber. Occasional measures are amended, thus requiring further action by the lower chamber.

It is to be noted that committees act exclusively on legislation which has received acceptance in principle on the second reading. With measures rarely being rejected later on, approval on that reading is for all practical purposes final. This procedure wastes little effort, since committees work only on legislation whose final passage is assured. Only the time and effort spent in the second reading with accompanying debate on rejected measures is spent without resulting legislation.

In arranging the calendar for the order of business, the cabinet has priority on the time of the parliament. If it needs all of the assembly's attention on its legislation, the time is made available. However, the parliament usually leaves one day a week for presentation of "private measures"—those from members outside the cabinet. Under this procedure, legislation needed by the government comes up for action in the order desired by it with the necessary schedule being allotted to each item. The result is early attention and action on government proposals.

With priority on the calendar and major debate on second reading, the fate of each measure is known in a matter of days or, at most, a few weeks. The cabinet can keep a minimum amount of legislation before the parliament, with the resulting lack of confusion. With a minimum

number of measures at issue, following the action of the government is relatively easy for everyone.

Most government proposals carry a vote of confidence with them. Under this practice the parliament has the choice of accepting or of rejecting the proposal. If rejection results, the consequence is an immediate election. Changes may be made in the proposed measure if the cabinet finds them acceptable. There is no chance for minority blocking, since each measure stands alone, with rejection by the parliament resulting in the fall of the government. This gives the cabinet effective control of its proposed legislation. A showdown occurs on each measure with the resulting passage of the ones needed to operate the government.

There is very little repeat legislation, because a high proportion of it is passed when first presented. However, the cabinet occasionally follows a practice which repeats a measure. A proposal may be presented to the parliament, without a vote of confidence, in order to test its reaction. Although the legislation fails, if the parliament reacts favorably enough, it can be presented at the next session with a vote of confidence and passed. Thus, measures can be enacted with little delay after a developing situation has made them desirable.

With a cabinet to back, or to oppose, political life splits on conservative and liberal lines with practically all parties taking their places to the right or to the left of political thought. This results in liberal and social welfare legislation being passed at a fairly continuous pace, since the cabinet and its party are apt to be replaced unless they keep in step with changing public opinion. We even have the case of the Conservatives in London in the 1930's taking such action. Realizing that unless this legislation were passed, the party would be replaced in office by the voters, the Conservatives embarked on a program of low-cost housing and other social welfare measures.

With questions from the floor on any operation which is not being handled satisfactorily, all affairs of the government must be dealt with promptly. These question-and-answer sessions result in a complete review of each particular phase of action and bring the presentation of correcting measures. Under this procedure, remedial legislation can be promptly enacted and the matter speedily straightened out to the satisfaction of the parliament. This results in most phases of operation being critically reviewed, with correcting measures being passed in the course of nearly every session of the parliament. In this manner the "legislative lag"—the time between the need for legisla-

tion and its actual passage—is reduced to a minimum and the government's affairs remain up to date.

Almost as important, the short legislative lag makes possible the passage of most legislation in small doses. With minor measures being passed yearly in most fields of action, something like 90 per cent of affairs come under this class. Under parliamentary procedure, these minor measures are run through the routine of passage as easily and efficiently as possible. Most action on domestic affairs follows the procedure of a periodic review of the situation, with minor measures being passed, and with good ideas of the next step being obtained for future consideration. The dull routine of domestic affairs is carried out easily and rapidly, thus reducing crises to a minimum.

With the short legislative lag keeping most affairs up to date, handling a major economic crisis needs but a minimum adjustment in order to deal with it. Also, when such crises do occur, or foreign affairs need much attention, the parliament has a minimum amount of work to do. It can drop minor matters and devote most of its time to major ones. Under severe crisis, the parliament does not have to speed up action, with the dropping of normal democratic procedure; it simply shifts almost entirely to major affairs.

The presence of an opposition in the parliament, with its privilege of questioning directly the cabinet members, restrains the committee from overaction. Also, the fact that a government which falls out of line with public opinion usually loses strength at the next election, tempers its actions. Thus the ability of the opposition leaders in pressing constructive criticism, along with their party's possible increase in strength at the next election, keeps the cabinet in check. A strong opposition is nearly as important as is a single-party majority to back the cabinet.

The members of the cabinet are the whole show, since any revolt against their leadership may result in a prompt election. The rank and file members of the legislature are simply voices and votes, with little or no individual power. They act as members of their parties to accept the proposals of the government, or to reject those recommendations and go before the people in an election for their decision. Since the delegates vote on each measure primarily as national representatives and secondarily as local delegates, this enables the parliament to act as a national governing body. The assembly holds none of its authority for individual members; it transmits maximum power under supervision and control from the people to the government.

10.

DEVELOPING MAXIMUM POWER

As the governing authority, the cabinet is strongly backed by the people organized into parties. So long as the committee remains in office, it must receive favorable action on a high percentage of its program. The government can take action on all domestic problems which face it, with stalemate and inaction rarely being forced on it by the legislature. In carrying out peacetime foreign affairs, the cabinet can act with assurance of support. During hostilities it is given maximum power, but remains under democratic controls. However, while gaining full support of its actions, the government must keep them in line with the wishes of a majority of the legislature.

Any serious disagreement between the cabinet and the parliament on any issue must be settled promptly. Sometimes an issue brings the reorganization of the cabinet; occasionally, it brings an election resulting in the changing of both cabinet and parliament. With the executive, a majority of the legislature, and a majority of the people in agreement, a solid front can be presented on every issue, with a united stand on foreign affairs being most important. This organization presents the closest cooperation and coordination possible between the executive, the legislature, and the people.

Since the prime minister is not the official head of the government, but simply the majority party leader of the cabinet and of the parliament, his replacement is not difficult. The Anthony Edens and the Neville Chamberlains can be removed from office when necessary or desired by the parliament. Prime ministers in poor health may easily retire, as did Lord Asquith and Ramsay MacDonald among many.

Being a committee of the parliament, the cabinet can be organized promptly to meet any situation at any time. If, for instance, the existing government is failing to handle a serious economic problem, a change to a more effective committee can result. When a recession begins, the change to the strongest possible government is usually speedy. This gives the new cabinet a chance to act before the economic difficulties are very far advanced. This flexibility assures the strongest possible government of being given the duty of handling economic and financial difficulties at an early stage, and of having the power to act speedily to arrest their progress.

Being a committee of the parliament, the cabinet can be organized

flexibly to meet any foreign crisis at any time. When the nation goes to war, a coalition government is readily organized under the leadership of a man of wartime caliber. The government is given the full support of all parties in a non-partisan war effort. Such a coalition government, despite its dispensing with peacetime majority support and minority opposition, remains under just as democratic control and supervision as in peacetime.

The changing of cabinets very rarely brings more than a minor decrease in their collective experience. Since its members are fully trained before taking office, a wartime cabinet becomes a fully effective government in a matter of hours; it needs only to be informed on top secret affairs. At its best during World War II, the Churchill coalition cabinet took office during an extreme emergency and was, from the start, as good a government as if it had been in office for years.

When the situation is so serious as to demand that maximum power be given to the executive, the flexibility of the system makes this possible in a democracy. Maximum power was given to the government of England during World War II. A democracy gave Winston Churchill all the authority he needed to fight a total war. During this exercise of delegated power, the government had authority nearly as complete, and fully as effective, as that of a dictatorship.

For this powerful position, the cabinet system must produce the man and train him. He must be a member who has served in the cabinet and who has proven his ability. He must have served in the parliament for years so as to be well acquainted at first hand with all governmental affairs. Having served in the assembly for years, he knows how to coordinate with it, and how to justify his every action to it. His intimate association with its members enables them to know him well enough to trust him with so much power. The system provides the necessary conditions for producing an able and outstanding leader and for training him for his supreme trial in any crisis.

As we have seen, the parliament requires that all activities of the government be placed under the authority of members of the cabinet, and that those officials be chosen from its membership. If an outsider is appointed to the cabinet he must campaign and win election to parliament within a reasonable time after taking office. Under this requirement, power is delegated to its own members, not to outsiders. Under this practice, the legislature is assured that it will remain in close touch with the individual cabinet member's actions. Radical

change in the organization of the government is thereby prevented, and a return to normal after the emergency is assured.

Because every proposed action of the government must be announced on the floor of the parliament before being taken, that body has advance notice of pending plans. It has a chance to make its criticisms known promptly. If the prime minister finds it advisable, he can alter the proposed plan before carrying it out. With an answer required to all questions put to cabinet members, the legislature keeps itself fully and promptly informed on all affairs. Under these conditions, the assembly stays in close contact with events and is ready to act any time that it might become necessary.

Under this system the prime minister can be given almost complete power by a simple majority vote, and power can be reduced at any time by the same method. With the parliament being fully informed on the government's performance, it can remove the prime minister promptly if needed. Vast powers can be delegated to him for the period of an emergency so that the nation can exert maximum speed and effectiveness in prosecuting a war. Under such conditions the parliament can set up any operation it desires; then can select a member to exercise that power under control and supervision. Thus, when needed, cabinet government can develop strength to match that of any other organization in the world.

11.

CABINET GOVERNMENT SPREADS

A strong characteristic of cabinet government and its base in the majority system is the ease of making compromises. On its method of formulating the will of the majority, and then of carrying out its instructions under the supervision of the minority or opposition, depends the success of the organization. Conciliation, of course, must be practiced to a high degree from top to bottom of the government to achieve nation-wide acceptance of its actions.

The leading party, wishing to remain in power, must compose minor differences of opinion on most issues in order to remain in public favor. The opposition, likewise, can only hope to gain majority support by stradling most minor controversial issues. No matter which party wins, it is elected only by compromising most issues so as to obtain a majority of votes. This gives the public only the choice between two or three major parties with little difference between them.

In choosing their members of parliament, the people must forego many extreme views and vote for the party whose candidate most nearly meets their wishes. The over-all result is the election of a governing party capable of handling and moderating all critical issues which may occur.

To follow the voters' wishes and the parties' compromises, only a committee can carry out moderate government. A cabinet, under supervision of a parliament, must make conciliation its first consideration in all critical matters so as to carry out actions satisfactory to a majority of the people. In this manner, compromise is carried out from the polls through the parties, the parliament, and the cabinet; from the voters at the source of government to the signature of the king or president at the head of it.

With some countries rarely having a majority party, and with many of them lacking parties strong enough to elect a president by a majority vote, only coalition cabinets make possible the continued use of democratic government at all in many cases. Committee action gives maximum opportunity for compromising the diverse political and economic views of the people. The resulting governments usually work successfully in placating and coordinating minorities, and in preventing crises from developing to serious proportions.

Whenever a government is failing to handle economic or other problems, the cabinet can be replaced promptly with, or without, the calling of an election. With this speedy changing of governments and with early elections when needed, crises are promptly handled and tempers are speedily calmed. The flexibility of organization which permits these prompt cabinet changes and elections after a minimum of delay is an extremely important feature of cabinet government.

In addition to committee government, democracy demands that its local units have as much power as advisable, since administration should be kept close to the people's control. In the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealths, the police power is in local hands. But most of Europe uses the policy of former governments—a national police. In France the central government appoints the prefects of departments who have considerable control of the affairs of cities and towns. Canada has enforcement of criminal law by her national organization. Big government, far from direct popular supervision and control, in some cases has too much power at the expense of democratic local control.

In order to keep power close to the people, it is necessary to resort to federation government in many countries. If a nation is of rela-

tively great area, then three-level organization is needed. Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, and five American countries have national, provincial, and local governments. The Netherlands, small but thickly populated, also allows considerable authority to her provincial units. Local control of as many affairs as possible is preferred to the nation-wide uniformity imposed in all matters by dictatorships.

Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa have federal organizations, and they remain in effective operation. They are using cabinet government with its union of powers and its strength. The resulting provincial units are strong enough to handle their own affairs, and to minimize the powers exercised by the national governments. Only affairs which must be handled on a nation-wide basis are being administered and increased by their federal administrations. This is good evidence that when cabinet government organizes as a federation, this method is strong enough to hold its own under any conditions.

Nations which have a people all of one language and race have a difficult enough job in organizing and operating a successful democracy. But countries with two or more races and languages among their peoples face a more troublesome career. Only the best in organization and leadership can accomplish such a difficult operation. Several countries have to face this problem as a daily issue, year in and year out, in operating their governments.

The outstanding performance of governing two races living under a democratic government has been in Canada. Some historians remark on the fact that she has retained unity, and has survived as a separate nation in spite of the serious problem of two major races to be constantly harmonized. Nearly one-third of her people are French Canadian, while the rest are predominantly English Canadian. To succeed there, a regime must be perfectly organized. The system consists of national and provincial governments, all using cabinet organization. The figurehead chief executive of the Commonwealth is the governor general, who is appointed by the government in London on the advice of the Canadian cabinet. He, in turn, appoints the lieutenant generals of the provincial units, also on the advice of the cabinet. Under her organization, Canada avoids entirely the show-down which occurs whenever a president is elected by the voters. The people merely choose the members of the parliament who, in turn, select the prime minister and the cabinet members. With the split of both English Canadians and French Canadians into conserva-

tive, liberal, and other parties, it is possible for the parliament to select nation-wide cabinets of conservatives or liberals.

Since cabinet government is essentially committee action under the leadership of a prime minister, the one-man actions of a president are avoided entirely. All issues can be given committee compromise treatment with crises being kept to a minimum. By this method of organization, Canada has been successful in handling a major and sometimes difficult issue as a routine matter, day after day, since her organization in 1867. Had Canada faced the showdown of electing a president every four years, it is doubtful that she could have remained one nation, or that responsible government could have survived there.

Up to the present time a prevailing idea has been that only a people with a high degree of literacy, well developed individual freedom, and some experience in governing themselves can make responsible government work. This is the method used to explain the failures in Europe and in Latin America. But if this be true, then how can Asia and Africa, lacking all three qualities, succeed in making responsible government work at all?

In sharp contrast to all the failing democracies in Europe has been the success of Kemal Pasha in establishing the Republic of Turkey. Under the constitution of 1923 the people elect the members of their parliament which consists of only one chamber. The majority system is used, with the elections being direct since 1946. The parliament chooses the president, the prime minister, and the cabinet. Kemal organized the People's party and, until his death in 1938, served as president of the republic. He provided the strong leadership needed to firmly establish the long-term success of his nation as a democracy.

At first he permitted no opposition party to organize. When he did allow an opposition in 1925, the Republican Progressive party was organized. But a Kurdish rebellion soon occurred and the opposition party, receiving the blame, was dissolved. Then, as Kemal saw the deterioration in political life, he permitted the Free party to organize in 1930. However, with too many reactionaries in this organization, it was also dissolved. Finally, some years after the death of Kemal, the Democratic party was organized in 1946, won the election of 1950, and named the cabinet and the president.

The republic which Kemal organized has become a model for Asia, Africa, and even for Europe and the Americas. Its strongest features have been cabinet government with able leadership and strong parties in control of the parliament. Thus the Turkish Republic has succeeded

among a people with more than 80 per cent illiterate, who had previously enjoyed but little individual freedom, and who had no previous political experience in responsible government. This Asiatic nation is a shining example of what can be achieved under cabinet government. She is showing us that our failures are organizational; that they are not to be blamed on the low level of literacy, lack of individual freedom and experience in democratic government. The free world is indebted to Turkey for becoming a model of what any intelligent and ambitious people can do under an outstanding leader and an accurate copy of England's cabinet government. It is to be hoped that, as all of Asia and Africa organize, democratic government will be as successful there.

Though England developed cabinet government over a period of several centuries, other countries can now copy her organization promptly and easily. England's failure to develop federation government expedited the loss of Ireland; while the United States achieved this method as a necessity for large countries and for ones with two or more races. European nations attempt to copy England's cabinet government, but rarely do they use her strong party system. The British Commonwealths and Turkey, on the other hand, have succeeded in fully copying her organization, and are being imitated by much of former colonial Asia and Africa since World War II.

PART THREE

SECOND-BALLOT PARLIAMENTS

12.

EXPERIMENTS IN ORGANIZATION

In 1750 each Continental European nation, except Holland and Switzerland, had a strong union of powers in the hands of her king. But in England, the parliament was pulling the legislative function its way. This created a temporary separation of powers, with the executive authority in the hands of the king, the legislative function in the hands of the parliament. In time, the parliament would also pull the executive authority its way. This would produce a renewed union of powers in the hands of the parliament. Thus the full cycle would include the original union of powers in the king's hands, a temporary separation of powers between the king and the parliament, then a renewed union of powers in the parliament's hands.

In 1749 came the publication in France of *L'Esprit des lois* by Baron de Montesquieu, in which he thought checks advisable between the executive and legislative powers in government. He did not know that the king would eventually lose his authority; that the upper chamber of the legislature would lose its strength; that the lower chamber would in time be the only one left in the field with power. He did not foresee that the small party of property owners of his time would later become the huge electorate of mass voters. To his two governing authorities, would be added a third—the electorate. The new governing mechanism would become: the electorate, the legislature, the executive—the voter and his party, the parliament, the prime minister and the cabinet. In time governments would become quite different from the English one that Montesquieu knew. He had caught only a transition in the evolution of governmental organization. From his work followed the theory of the separation of executive and legislative powers in government.

Montesquieu's interpreters also thought that the transient separation of powers would be permanent. For many decades, this over-emphasized theory reinforced the king's continued control of the

cabinet in European governments; separated the cabinet from responsibility to the legislature. A prominent part in this tendency was played by George III of England who, by corruption of the parliament, ruled through Lord North's cabinet from 1770 to 1782. A union of powers in a parliament had failed to hold its own against a king! The parliament regained control in 1782, but could not soon overcome the damage caused by its temporary failure. Thus the working theory of a union of powers in a cabinet committee of a parliament did not capture the European scene until the nineteenth century was well on its way.

Early democracies were organized on an experimental basis, using the separation of powers, with many failures resulting. Before Montesquieu's time, the English Republic (1649-60) failed while using this method. After Montesquieu's time, there occurred in France, between 1789 and 1797, the organization and failure of four governments using this method, with the last one falling to Napoleon. The influence of Montesquieu's ideas had permitted the terrible havoc of more wars in Europe.

The union of powers in a cabinet committee accountable to the parliament came slowly to continental European nations. The first responsible government was organized by Sweden in 1809. After the revolutions of 1830, it was adopted by Belgium and France; and after the revolutions of 1848, by Piedmont (Italy), The Netherlands, and Switzerland. By 1867 Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Rumania had followed with responsible governments. This was the year that the English system was first clearly outlined and brought to the attention of the outside world by Walter Bagehot in *The English Constitution*. But, without a clear idea of that government until 1867, much of Europe had already copied the earlier stages of its development.

The idea of a one-chamber parliament came late to Europe, even though France started out with this organization during her Revolutionary period. In England the small group of large property owners held seats in the House of Lords, and controlled the House of Commons with its few voters and poor apportionment. When the wider suffrage of 1832 gave the control of the House of Commons to the middle class, that chamber came into power. The control of the House of Lords had been broken, and soon declined. But not until 1867, did the world learn of this development from Walter Bagehot. England's parliament had had two chambers of nearly equal powers only until 1832, but the rest of the world, almost without exception, has copied that early two-chamber parliament.

The idea of strong party government came late to Europe. Though England had been ruled by a majority party and its cabinet from 1693, the aristocracy and large property owners controlled the government because less than 5 per cent of the men had the franchise until 1832. After that year, with nearly 10 per cent of the men voting, the middle class gained control of the majority party. But not until widespread suffrage began in 1867, did England present the picture of a democratic kingdom ruled by a strong party of mass voters. Unfortunately, as is plainly evident, Europe still pays scant attention to the need for strong party rule.

England's use of majority elections has had an intermittent and irregular following in European nations. For in 1789, France started to use the second-ballot system of elections; and most of Europe followed her lead. Under this system, single-member constituencies are used, with all majority candidates being elected. Then, where a majority does not result in the first election, a second ballot is held in order to select a majority one, if possible, in these constituencies. Where the people do not agree on a majority candidate in the first election, they have a second chance to choose one. It is felt that minorities have a better chance to be fairly and adequately represented under this method of elections.

However, in these second ballots, the small parties tend to gang up against the strongest party's candidates, and to defeat them. Thus the leading party elects its first-election majority candidates, but in the second ballot does not elect enough of its first-election leading candidates to win, or even to approach, a majority in the legislature. A case of this was the 1903 election in Germany when the leading Social Democrats won 56 seats in the Reichstag by a majority in the first contest; but in the second ballot elected only 24 of its 66 first-election leading candidates; and only 1 of its 52 first-election second-place ones, for a total of 81 seats. Under the majority system the Social Democratic party could have elected at least 122 members to the Reichstag.

Under no necessity of working for a majority in each constituency in the first election in order to win, the parties split easily into factions. Each of them presents a candidate in the first election, thus badly splitting the vote. The leading parties lose many seats, which are won by small local factions in the second ballot. Parliaments become badly split into factions and are seriously weakened. Before World War I, the parliaments of Austria-Hungary and Germany were too weak to reduce the power of kings so as to prevent the war.

As splitting continues, there follows the almost complete breakdown of parties. In France before 1940, except for the extreme left, there were no political parties at all; there were only political groups. In Italy, before 1919, except for the Socialists and the Republicans, there was the same near absence of parties. This second-ballot system can properly be called a "majority party killer." The system was used by more than a dozen nations but is no longer active. The story of how it weakened the parliaments of Europe before 1914 has yet to be fully told.

With the use of the second ballot, no prime minister can call on the people for the majority backing needed to rule firmly. Lacking strong parties, most European nations have not fully developed the power of a prime minister to dissolve a parliament following a defeat by it. Most European countries attempt to use the dissolution instrument, but without majority elections and without strong parties, its effectiveness is blunted. Because they do not have to bear the effort and expense of frequent elections, the individual members and small parties overthrow the cabinet for the lightest of reasons whenever they desire. Representative government cannot be developed into strong party government, but must remain in a weaker form; it uses coalition cabinets, and is called parliamentary government.

The weak coalition governments of Continental Europe result because power is spread too thinly. After being appointed, the cabinet may be voted down, with the parliament not usually being liable to face an election. The legislature simply appoints another committee which may, or may not, be backed either. Power is not strongly delegated by the parliament at all, since it may be withdrawn after the first unpopular move that the cabinet may make. In the resulting weakly-backed coalition governments, authority is thinly spread over an entire parliament. In the case of France, the power is held by over 600 members of the legislature. This is indeed a long way from the strength of a cabinet committee of a majority party.

The records of the trials, the arguments, the failures, and the short lives of coalition cabinets of European nations show their undesirability. The failure of many of them, along with the fall of responsible government, shows the necessity of forming a majority party at the polls. To succeed, the people must consolidate their majority party at the polls, then exercise their strength through the parliament and the

cabinet. A review of the careers of European countries will show the necessity for strong party government.

13.

FRANCE—NATION OF MANY GOVERNMENTS

The States General of France is recorded as beginning in 1302. In its early years, it played an important part in adjusting the monarch's power to the needs of the nation. With the disaster at Poitiers in 1356 and the captivity of King John, the parliament attempted to rule France. With the Third Estate under the leadership of Etienne Marcel, the States General assumed power. The scenes of 1356-58 were the forerunners of those of 1789-94. After three years of this poorly organized anarchy, the king resumed power. Though the assembly was no longer powerful, it survived until 1614.

After a long lapse the States General was again called into action in 1789 to help overcome the collapse of France's finances. Its first problem was that of the organization of its three estates. If the nobles, the clergy, and the commons met as three separate chambers, then the people's delegates would be powerless. If the States General met as a single chamber, then the people's representatives would have nearly a majority in it. Faced by a weak and faltering Louis XVI, the Third Estate won in a few weeks, and a speedy reform was carried out in the following months.

Having only aristocratic England and the newly organized United States as models for the organization of a new government, the mistakes started piling up. Under Montesquieu's idea of separation of powers, no member of the parliament could become an executive minister. Thus the operation of the administrative departments remained outside the parliament's control. But the monarch and his ministers were dependent upon a distrustful National Assembly for the legislation needed to operate the government. In further decreasing the power of the king, the Assembly abolished the provinces and created 83 departments; then further weakened the control of the king's ministers over these. The reforms had not only failed to bring the administration under control of the National Assembly, but had almost abolished the central government itself. The Assembly, after drawing up the constitution of 1791, gave way to its successor.

The Legislative Assembly, organized under the new constitution, consisted of a single chamber elected by the property owners. But

the new body had been doomed when the late National Assembly had provided that none of its own members could become delegates in the new body. Thus the Legislative Assembly was composed of totally inexperienced second-raters, and its days were therefore numbered. Foreign armies crossed France's borders. The Commune of Paris increasingly dominated the parliament, with disorder increasing. In 11 months the Legislative Assembly had run its course and provided the way for its successor.

The National Convention, which assembled in September 1792, was elected by manhood suffrage, but became a dictatorship under control of the Commune of Paris. It operated through committees, the chief one being the 12-man Committee of Public Safety. The Convention declared a republic; executed the king; re-created a government, an army, a munitions industry; and thus saved France in an emergency. But its most remembered event was the Reign of Terror. In due time, it created the Directory and came to an end in October 1795.

The Directory was France's fourth attempt to organize responsible government. This time a stronger executive was used in the form of the Directory of five members, one of whom was replaced yearly by the parliament. For the first time that body had two chambers, with the upper one—the Council of the Ancients—having elder members with supposedly more conservative action. As too often happens with separate executive and legislature, the Directory fell out of step with the parliament. Because of committee action without supervision by the legislature, the government failed to take positive action as needed, and soon lost the support of the people. It was then fairly easy for the republic's victorious general, Napoleon Bonaparte, to take over the government. He led the nation to conquer an empire; in due time the latter was blotted out by foreign armies.

France had made four attempts to organize responsible government, only to see them all fail in a short period of eight years. Fortunately, her worst mistakes were gradually corrected under later governments. But the second ballot, which she acquired in 1789, continued dogging France and preventing strong parties. No matter how she organized other phases of her government, her difficulties continued.

In 1814, the Bourbons returned to the throne of France with Louis XVIII. Ruling as a constitutional monarch with a parliament, this king kept the royalists in check. Although only 100,000 citizens could vote, Louis maintained enough democracy in the government so as to remain on the throne until his death in 1824.

Succeeding to the throne, Charles X soon proved to be a pre-revolu-

tionary Bourbon. He was too autocratic for even this undemocratic parliament. Soon, his July ordinance which ended freedom of the press and dissolved the newly elected parliament, resulted in the revolution of 1830 and in his dethronement.

Next came Louis Philippe who acted the part of the "Citizen King." After coming to the throne, he increased the number of voters to 200,000, but retained enough control of the parliament to produce very undemocratic government. The ministers became responsible to the parliament, but Louis Philippe could control the parliament as easily as had George III in England before him. He lost the throne for himself and the Bourbons in the revolution of 1848.

The Second French Republic was then established for another trial at responsible government under universal manhood suffrage. Under this constitution, the executive was a single individual elected by the people. His command of the army and the power to appoint the cabinet members made him a powerful figure. But a president elected by the people is accountable only to the people, and then only on election day. Two authorities—a president and a parliament, both elected by the people—threatened a contest for power in the Latin American style. Moreover, election of the president by the people and the failure to bar members of the former ruling families, left the way open for the monarchists to win elections with ease. The stage was set for the nephew of the great Napoleon, and under the spell of memories of the "Little Corporal," Louis Napoleon was given the highest office in the land by the people of France. Four years later, the Second Republic went the way of the First, to be downed in due course by foreign armies.

Under the Constitutional Laws of 1875, the Third French Republic, avoided some of the mistakes which had often proved so costly. The presidential office was held by a single person who was chosen, not by the people, but by their parliament. The cabinet, although appointed by the president, was chosen by the National Assembly and remained responsible to it. This organization resulted in the honor of the presidency usually being conferred on an elder statesman, who was known to have no designs on the Republic, and who wielded little power. France had finally arrived at responsible government. The Third Republic survived much longer than had preceding ones.

With the Constitutional Laws of 1875, France continued the use of the second ballot. This system was used by the Third Republic, except for short breaks from 1885 to 1889 and from 1919 to 1927. But, unlike the other nations using this system, anyone could run for office

in the second election; even new candidates could enter. Much was the cross bargaining and bitter campaigning that characterized French politics. Few seats were won by a majority vote. And, of course, there was no majority party developed; in fact, there were hardly any parties at all, except in the extreme left. There were no strong parties to form the base for stable democratic government.

The new government worked passably, except for a fault which has loomed large in recent history; the governments were too short lived. During the 70 years between 1871 and 1940, there were 106 cabinets in office, with an average life of slightly over eight months. These frequent changes occurred because, although France was using cabinet government, she had weakened one of its more important features—the dissolution of the parliament whenever the government falls.

The prime minister had the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies with the approval of the upper house—the Senate. But President MacMahon dissolved the Chamber in 1877, merely because he disliked its majority. After the following election, the same majority remained in office; the use of the power to dissolve the Chamber became taboo. Since there was no longer a resulting election to face if they failed to support the government, the individual members and the small groups could, and frequently did, overthrow the cabinet.

Lacking the use of majority elections, and lacking the power of the prime minister to call for approval or disapproval of the cabinet's policies by the people at the polls, the various groups in the Chamber were never consolidated into parties of any size. Political life up until 1940 was never organized to form a stable government. The cabinet still depended for its majority support on the individual whims of the members of the Chamber who served out their four-year terms, regardless of whether they supported the cabinet or not.

Such was the unstable political organization of France which faced Germany under Hitler, when he reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936, during a break between French cabinets. Her leaders, who had faced this possibility ever since 1918, were not ready for action. The French army which stood ready to protect the nation, and which should have marched at the first sign of German reoccupation of the Rhineland, had no stable and resolute government to direct it. The army which had marched into the Ruhr in 1923, failed to move into the Rhineland in 1936. France had missed a vital chance of preventing World War II.

From then on, the armies beyond the Maginot Line became stronger

by the day; soon they could breach the defense that had been organized to stop them. For France the war was lost, not in June 1940, but in the preceding years of shifting cabinets and unstable government. After many trials, France had not yet perfected her organization. Again, the penalty was her failure before foreign armies.

Under the constitution of 1946 the Fourth French Republic made changes in her organization, but still retained the seeds of trouble. The prime minister still lacked the power to dissolve the Assembly and to call an election whenever a government fell. It was provided that the prime minister could dissolve the Assembly, if two cabinets were dismissed on a vote of confidence in a period of 18 months. However, under her parliamentary rules, a cabinet-backed measure did not necessarily carry a vote of confidence also. After a defeat on legislation, the government could resign at once, or it could call for a vote of confidence to see if it could remain in office. However, after having been defeated on a measure, its resignation followed without calling for a vote of confidence. Although the prime minister could dissolve the Assembly and call an election when a government fell on a vote of confidence, he could not so act when it fell on merely a cabinet-backed measure. Governments fell as frequently as usual in France.

Another glaring defect was proportional representation which had been used in the 1919 and 1924 elections and abandoned; but was adopted again in 1946. As the system strengthened the Communist party in the 1920's, it did so again as they became the largest party in the National Assembly after the election of 1946. A party which advocates the overthrow of democracy itself, had a large place in the Assembly and weakened the government. Formerly almost without parties, France had too many strongly organized ones. They found it almost impossible to cooperate in running the government. During this period of 12 years, the effects of proportional representation stalemated the handling of urgent affairs.

Without an effective government, France failed to adjust to a changing world in which democratic nations can no longer rule their colonies autocratically. With the continual failure after 1945 to modernize the status of her colonies and their administration, the Fourth French Republic collapsed early in 1958. France had failed again in responsible government under another constitution.

If France is to survive she must achieve a well-developed responsible government. The earlier errors in organization have still to be corrected if a democratic France is to succeed. On her statesmen

falls the urgent need to establish majority elections and build strong parties, in order to assure the future stability and success of democratic government. Will France under her Fifth Republic make up the deficiency in time to survive as an independent and democratic nation?

14.

EUROPE EXTENDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

Until the latter part of the eighteenth century the standard chief executives of continental European nations were ruling hereditary emperors, kings, or other titled heads. Their peoples had long suffered from the variabilities of these monarchs. The "Enlightened Despots" included: Catherine the Great of Russia, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and Joseph II of Austria. But usually, European countries were ruled by weak and inept kings. All too often they were governed by tyrannical ones. Sometimes monarchs took the road of conquest. But, always, European peoples were ruled by kings who found it impossible to produce governments that were satisfactory to their subjects.

As parliaments came into being and gained power, they advocated the interests of the people and tended to cut down the authority of the thrones. As monarchs tried to keep their power and to limit the parliaments, revolution followed revolution across Europe. It was not easy to make the transition from absolute autocrats to responsible chief executives and cabinets under the supervision of parliaments.

The first attempts to control kings were made in Sweden where the careers of Louis XIV and Napoleon of France were paralleled by those of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII on the road to glory. Sweden, with Finland from the twelfth century and Estonia from the sixteenth, gained the addition under Gustavus Adolphus (1611-32) of the Eastern Baltic provinces of Livonia, Ingria, and East Karelia, along with two sections of the North German coast. As a leading defender of the Protestant cause during the Thirty Years War (1618-48), she won domination of the Baltic Sea. And, of course, there followed continual wars with Denmark, Poland, and Russia. The wars of Charles XII lost the provinces east of the Baltic to Peter the Great in 1721. Sweden's place in the sun, won during the Thirty Years War, had drawn to a close, but she would not accept her former and smaller status.

Sweden had opened the career of her parliament, the Riksdag, in

1435. The disasters during and following the reign of Charles XII resulted in the measures of 1719 that were to restrain the king. The Riksdag gained the power to name a list from which the members of the royal council were appointed by the king, who then had only two votes in the body. However, the four chambers of the Riksdag prevented any effective action by that body. The lower chamber was chosen by so few voters that elections could be heavily influenced by foreign money seeking to control the Riksdag. The contending of the war party, called the "Hats," and the peace party, called the "Caps," resulted in extremely violent political life. Sweden was carried uselessly into a Russian-Turkish war (1741-43), resulting in the loss of part of Finland; and then into the Seven Years War (1757-62) against Prussia. This early attempt at responsible government never became effective; it was withdrawn in 1772.

Sweden's return to the absolute rule of her kings under Gustavus III (1771-92) and Gustavus IV Adolphus (1792-1809) was short. This period saw the useless entrance into a Russian-Turkish conflict (1788-90); war against Napoleon (1805-07) which resulted in the loss of the German possessions; then war with Russia (1808-09) resulting in the loss of Finland. However, the lost territory was partially offset by the doubtful acquisition in 1814 of the throne of Norway, which retained its separate parliament elected by a widespread vote.

Then in 1809 came the dethronement of Gustavus IV Adolphus and the strong measures which made the ministers responsible to the Riksdag. Sweden had ended her warlike career. In 1867 the Riksdag was reduced to two chambers, thus making responsible government fully effective. With only 400,000 voters in 1905, the franchise was widened, and she finally received a more democratic government.

The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 saw the union of The Netherlands and Belgium under the former's king, William I. The united parliament was elected by few voters, while the king retained power. Belgian desires for reforms went unanswered. In the revolution of 1830, she won her freedom and responsible government. In 1848 the franchise was extended somewhat, with the result that Belgium was one of the few nations not to suffer an uprising in that year of European revolutions. By 1893 enough citizens could vote so as to bring democratic government.

As for The Netherlands, the franchise was increased in 1832 to total 100,000 persons. The revolution of 1848 made the cabinet responsible to the States General. In 1887 the suffrage was again increased, but even then it included only 400,000 persons. Delayed effective votes

had played their part in costing The Netherlands and Belgium the disadvantages of being separate, and small, economic and defense units. The Netherlands had produced the world's first constitution, the Union of Utrecht of 1579, but had failed to lead Europe in developing responsible government.

In Switzerland three cantons had the vote, along with direct democracy, from the Middle Ages. Eleven more cantons won the franchise between 1830 and 1832, the rest in 1848. The brief civil war of the Sonderbund showed the necessity for a strong central government, bringing the constitution and federal system of 1848. Strengthened in 1874, it reached substantially the present organization. Switzerland now has responsible government; but since the defeat of its measures by the parliament does not require the resignation of any, or of all, of the Federal Council, she has yet to fully develop cabinet government. Remarkable is the fact that Switzerland, as Europe's early republic from 1291, did not play a more prominent part in the development of responsible government.

In disunited Italy the revolutions of 1848 failed, except for Sardinia (and Piedmont) which received responsible government with a parliament elected by a limited suffrage. This start, in the hands of Victor Emanuel II and Cavour, was extended to include all of Italy by 1871. The first extension of the franchise soon came in 1881, when the number of voters was increased from 600,000 to 2,000,000. Italy's parliamentary government had become more democratic, but the power of the people's votes was not reflected in strong parties. The use of the second ballot stopped the development of parties, except for the small Socialist and Republican ones.

Under the kingdom from 1848 to 1919 Italy had a reasonably stable government. The prime minister's power to dissolve the parliament was used often enough to prevent the too frequent falling of the cabinet, of which there were 61 in the 71 years during this period. With an average life of the cabinet of slightly over one year, the record was somewhat better than France's eight-months average. Italy had a measure of stability, since prime ministers remained in office longer than the average, merely altering cabinets. But she developed no strong parties. She needed them badly during World War I, and again in the critical episode of 1922 when Mussolini started his march on Rome.

Portugal began her chaotic career of attempted responsible government with the election of 1821, but not until 1852 did she settle down to peaceful conditions. By that year, she had achieved under her

king, a Cortes with an hereditary upper chamber, and a lower chamber elected by direct vote of the property owners. The franchise was soon extended. However, without clean elections and political life, the usefulness of what parties she had left was almost ended by the 1880's. Rotativism—the rotation of politicians in office where they shared the spoils of office—became the practice. The breakdown of the parliament's effectiveness finally led to the dictatorship of 1907 in a last effort to save the monarchy. There followed the revolution of 1910, and the republic.

To Spain, perhaps, goes the credit for first beginning representative assemblies in Europe. Aragon had a parliament from 1162; and Castile had one from 1169. It is supposed that the Dominicans adopted the organization, and soon it showed up all across Europe in country after country. But Spain did not develop her early start, and did not lead Europe into responsible government.

After a lapse of centuries, a new Cortes met at Cadiz and adopted the constitution of 1812; but this revival ended two years later. Another start in 1820 was squelched two years later by French armies. She again attempted responsible government with the constitution of 1834. Its brief career was followed by the much amended document of 1837, and a period of disorder. Peaceful conditions finally arrived in 1858 to last for 10 years. But without strong parties, effective parliamentary government could not be developed. The revolution of 1868 was followed by another one in 1873, bringing the republic of 1873-74 with four presidents in 11 months.

Restoration of the monarchy in 1875, was followed by the constitutional changes of the next year. Spain then had her Cortes with an hereditary upper chamber, and a popularly-elected lower one. Manhood suffrage in mostly single-member constituencies was used with the second-ballot system. However, Madrid and Barcelona elected their delegates by proportional representation. Strong parties were never achieved. The weak parties, enjoying the spoils of office, alternated in power. This unstable government drew to a close in 1923 with the dictatorship of de Rivera.

Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century came responsible governments in Norway and in Denmark. Norway had received a widespread vote in 1814 to lead European nations. Barred from the Storting, the King's ministers did not become responsible to it until 1884.

Denmark, on the other hand, had received a constitution and a widespread vote in 1849, but only Conservative-party cabinets were

appointed by the king. By 1901 the parties of the left had practically wiped out the Conservatives. The throne reluctantly permitted the government to become responsible to the Rigsdag. Montesquieu's separation of powers had finally faded out of the European scene.

Thus England's responsible government was followed by ten nations of Western Europe. Southeastern Europe followed with responsible governments in Greece in 1863, Rumania in 1866, Bulgaria in 1879, and Serbia in 1889. But these governments of Southeastern Europe, along with those of Portugal and Spain, were even weaker than those of France and Italy. In Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, and Turkey, responsible government did not arrive at all before World War I.

15.

CENTRAL EUROPE REMAINS AUTOCRATIC

With the end of the Napoleonic wars, Austria became the leading nation of Continental Europe. Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, she played the leading part in the Concert of Europe which suppressed most tendencies toward responsible government for the next few decades. In the revolutions of 1820, Austrian armies suppressed the movements in Naples and Piedmont in Italy, while French armies did likewise in Spain; but the British navy prevented any aid to Spain in recovering her Latin American colonies. In the revolutions of 1830, France changed her kings; while Belgium gained freedom from The Netherlands, and achieved responsible government; but in Germany, Italy, and Poland, the movements were soon suppressed.

The revolutions of 1848 were Europe's big effort to gain responsible government and effective votes, but the results were varied in their extent. In Denmark, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, further advances were made toward responsible government. In France, the success of the revolution was only temporary under President Louis Napoleon. Failure in most of Italy was overcome by success in Sardinia (and Piedmont) which brought union, along with responsible government, to all Italy. In Austria, Prince Metternich was driven from power, but soon the revolution was suppressed. In Hungary, the movement succeeded temporarily, until Russian armies came in to aid in suppressing it. In Germany, the revolutions succeeded temporarily, but the Frankfurt Assembly wasted four months before offering the king of Prussia the throne of a democratic Germany. The

crown was refused; the assembly failed. Central Europe still lacked responsible government.

In Poland the first parliament met in 1467, thus beginning its important part in governing the country. However, only one dissenting vote was necessary in order to kill a proposed measure in the parliament. That body's action was often reduced to a stalemate when the active use of this proceeding began in 1652. With the death of Sigismund in 1572, the throne was made elective and soon became a prize for competing powerful neighbors. With her government almost paralyzed, Poland failed to keep pace with her neighbors, and suffered the first partition of 1772. Too late (1788), she made the throne hereditary and adopted majority action in her parliament. Poland suffered two more partitions, and the end of her independence in 1795. She revolted against foreign rule in 1830, but the Russian armies handled the situation in short order. Poland did not regain her freedom and responsible government until 1919.

In 1867 the Austrian Empire was reorganized into a dual monarchy, with an Austrian parliament and a Hungarian one. In Hungary the limited franchise allowed only one-fourth of the men to vote. In order to assure aristocratic control, the voters were grouped into five classes to elect the members of the lower house, with the second ballot being used in many cases. The upper house of parliament was hereditary. The determination to rule the other races finally resulted in a single Hungarian party, with cabinet government being fairly well developed.

But in Austria, under much the same organization, the government remained weak. By 1907 manhood suffrage had been adopted, but an Austrian party strong enough to govern had not been achieved. She was still largely ruled by the bureaucracy. Control of foreign affairs and military affairs for the joint kingdom remained under control of the throne. The shaky dual kingdom opened World War I with its attack on Serbia.

Too late, federal government was offered the Austro-Hungarian peoples less than one month before the Armistice. The empire shattered into seven sections at the end of the war. Delay in achieving responsible government, based on effective votes and strong parties, had ended the usefulness of Austria-Hungary as an economic and political unit. Her failure placed a heavy economic burden on her fractured units. The various peoples affected were reallocated among their new nations with the semblance of responsible government.

But more than republics are required for success; disaster followed for them all.

In 1850, when Frederick William IV organized the Lantag in Prussia, the franchise was made indirect and unequal. The votes for the lower house were divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid. Electors in multi-member districts then chose the members of the lower chamber. The upper house was made up of appointments by the throne for life and for hereditary memberships. Though Prussia had manhood suffrage it was neither direct, nor equal, nor effective.

As the nation drew together, the North German Confederation was organized in 1867, then enlarged into the German Empire in 1871. Manhood suffrage was in force for elections to the lower house—the Reichstag, with the second ballot being used. The Conservatives and Liberals were strong at first, but soon they declined, as other parties grew, with the Social Democrats in the lead. The splitting up of parties spread until, by 1893, the Reichstag included 15 of them. Threatening the power of Bismarck, and then of Wilhelm II, was no majority party such as had faced the English kings two centuries before.

The upper house, the Bundesrat, was made up of appointments by the confederated governments. With 17 of the 61 votes in that body, Prussia could easily arrange a majority in it. The Bundesrat became the ruling body, usually overruling the Reichstag. The chancellor continued to be responsible to the emperor. Manhood suffrage never became effective in Germany. Control of the government could not be taken from the emperor. Behind Germany's government continued the unequal, indirect, and ineffective votes of Prussia, which had three-fifths of her population.

England had taken over a century under cabinet government to gain effective votes. But Prussia from 1850 and Germany from 1867, with rudimentary cabinet government, did not have enough time to fully develop it. All too soon, came Wilhelm II in 1888 with his ambitions for empire, his arms races, and his international intrigues. As crisis followed crisis, the last one in 1914 resulted in war which dethroned the Hohenzollerns. Germany would henceforth have an elected president. As France discarded the Bourbons and the Bonapartes, so Germany finally discarded the Hohenzollerns and became a republic.

The end of the Hohenzollerns coincided with the near end of crowns in Europe. Napoleon eliminated thrones in Germany west of the Rhine, and reduced Germany east of the Rhine from more than 300

states to only 39. As finally consolidated in 1871, the German Empire included 22 titled states. Intermarriage with other royal families of Europe was part of Germany's diplomacy. By 1914 her crowns were tied to many of Europe's ruling families. The German Republic of 1919 ended this royal marrying ground of the Continent, and events following two world wars have left ruling heads in only eight countries. European nations were to use mostly elected presidents in future years. No longer were emperors and kings to compete with parliaments for power. Where they still reign today they no longer rule.

The world saw the winning of the "War for Democracy" in 1918. European nations confidently organized governments with parliaments, responsible cabinets, and figurehead presidents or kings. But responsible government had succeeded only in Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It had been a qualified success in France and Italy. European peoples overlooked the fact that it had already failed in the rest of their nations. Switching from king to president, and from hereditary upper house of parliament to an elected one, would accomplish little. Monarchy had failed in European countries. Moreover, the absence of strong parties to rule had usually failed, no matter whether in kingdom or republic.

To the hopeful and peaceful Europe of 1919, the future looked bright. But her nations were attempting to organize responsible governments without strong parties. This practice had already failed all during the nineteenth century, even where kings had served as stabilizers. But most of the Monarchs were gone, and popular government must now stand alone. European nations, which had usually failed to develop strong parties under the second-ballot system, now switched to proportional representation. Increased failures soon occurred under the new method.

PART FOUR

PROPORTIONED PARLIAMENTS

16.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

From the supposed failure of majority elections and of second ballots to give adequate representation to defeated minorities, came the idea of proportional seating in legislatures according to the ballots cast for parties. It is thought that the rights of minorities can be protected adequately only by giving them seats in parliaments in proportion to the ballots which they receive in elections. Accordingly, systems of proportional representation are organized so that the percentage of seats received by each party will agree closely with its percentage of votes. There have been developed more than 300 varieties of the method, providing much variation for the systems in use.

As with the second-ballot system, the lead in proportional representation came from France. In 1793 two proposed, but defeated, constitutions included such a feature. There followed in 1820 the first publication of a proportional plan, written by Gergonne. In 1842 a plan drawn by Considérant was proposed for use in Switzerland, but it was not adopted. France had started this feature on its way, but there were no immediate results.

Under a plan drawn by Georg Andrae, Denmark in 1856 became the first nation in Europe to adopt proportional representation. Following the same principles, the famous plan of Thomas Hare of England was published in 1859. He was ably seconded by John Stuart Mill in 1862. Although the Hare plan has achieved occasional adoption by cities and provinces in the English-speaking world, it has rarely won acceptance by national governments. In its system of fractional voting by candidates regardless of party, instead of voting by party plus choice of its candidates, lies its limited use among proportional systems. A method which permits a citizen to cast fractional votes for parties can never take its place in party government. Since modern democracy has become party government, only those

measures which are adapted to it win wide acceptance. Thus the plan of Andrae and of Hare, lacking party-list voting, received only a limited place among proportional systems.

The next moves in Europe came from Switzerland, where Morin presented a party-list system in 1861. Naville followed with his plan in 1884. Then in 1889 came the big opening for proportional representation. As a result of the election in the Italian canton of Ticino, the Conservatives, with 51 per cent of the ballots, won nearly 69 per cent of the seats in the Grand Council. A successful revolt by the under-represented Liberals was put down by federal troops. Two years later a system of proportional representation was adopted as recommended by the federal government. This opening led to widespread use of the method in Switzerland.

The system was adopted by Belgium and Serbia in 1899, Finland in 1906, Sweden in 1909, Bulgaria and Portugal in 1911, and in most European nations after World War I. Thus the free-party-list system, which gives citizens a preference for candidates while voting their party ticket, became the leading proportional system of Europe and of the world.

Under proportional representation, several seats in a legislature are filled by election from a large constituency, with the votes being proportioned among the seats to select the winners. Constituencies cover from 2 to 30 seats, but in the case of Latvia all of the 100 seats in the parliament. Parties usually present lists of candidates to fill all of the seats, even though not expecting to win them all. The voter casts his ballot for his party slate, giving his preferences for candidates under the free-party-list system. The resulting votes of the multi-member constituency are used to proportion its seats among the parties. The candidates win according to their leading places on the party lists, or according to the preferences when they are decisive. To each party is allocated the proportionate number of seats indicated by its percentage of the ballots. Thus in a ten-seat constituency, 10 per cent of the votes win one seat, 20 per cent two seats, and so forth. The hoped-for result is a close reflection of each party's strength in the legislature.

The number of seats per constituency largely determines the chances that small parties have of winning. If there are five members elected from a constituency, a party needs nearly 20 per cent of the votes to win its first seat. While if there are ten members, then nearly 10 per cent is needed for each seat. If a larger number of members are elected from a constituency, then the percentage of votes needed to

win each place decreases accordingly. The method gives small factions an excellent chance to gain seats. Many parties become possible, with parliaments becoming badly split up between them. Under proportional representation, we note the appearance of extremist factions, because seats may be won with much less than a majority or even a strong plurality vote. The smaller the percentage of ballots required to gain a seat, the more extreme and narrow become the factions. Nation after nation in Europe, after 1918, required 10 per cent or less of the votes to win a seat, thus permitting the emergence of extremist factions to the left and to the right in their legislatures. This results because small parties are not restricted to democratic ones. Any non-democratic faction has the same opportunity as any other party, even if it advocates the overthrowing of responsible government itself.

When moderates debate in proportioned legislatures, the extremists often break up the discussion with their radical views. After 1918, parliaments frequently degenerated into dissenting and disorderly mobs. Since only moderates can rule to the satisfaction of a majority of the people, the extremists constitute a useless element in a legislature as far as effective governing is concerned. If political and economic difficulties occur, their small block of members can expand in an election or two to a size large enough to end responsible government, as occurred in Italy in 1922, and in Germany in 1933. They form only an obstructionist opposition, incapable of debating or of governing in democracies. Though the extremists have no place at all in a democratic assembly, proportional representation places them there freely.

In assuring proportional seating to all parties, the method overlooks the strong requirement of a majority organization to rule. Since narrow factions win many seats in a parliament, the leading moderate party has much difficulty in adhering to its broad general platform, and in holding its voters. The leading party goes to the people in an election and asks in vain for a majority. With the leading party always falling short of its majority of seats in the parliament, it must form coalition cabinets jointly with smaller factions which advocate narrow specific policies. Coalition cabinets include several small parties, often arranged only after days of bargaining. These coalition governments face many pitfalls in ruling their countries.

Of the 21 European nations using the system between World War I and World War II, only Belgium and Ireland had majority parties in their parliaments at all. The one in Belgium lasted from 1913 to 1919, that of Ireland from 1932 to 1943. In all of the other proportion-

using countries, there was no majority party during this period. In over half of them, there was not even a leading organization holding 40 per cent of the seats in the parliament. Of the whole group, none could be called a majority-party-governed nation. They could only be called minority-party-coalition-governed countries.

Systems of proportional representation, as to organization and results, may be classified according to the number of seats assigned to each constituency. In Ireland these units comprise from three (rural) to nine (urban) members each. If there are three seats per constituency, then nearly 33 per cent of the votes are needed for a party to win its first member; while if there are nine seats, then nearly 11 per cent of the votes are needed for a party's first winner. Small parties have a relatively easy job of winning seats in only the latter case. Also in Ireland, excess votes in one constituency cannot be transferred to other areas, and so cannot help elect members there. This provision limits small parties to some extent. Ireland thereby avoids the worst features of proportioning, and can achieve a majority party about half the time.

Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland also use systems with these limiting features of a small number of seats per constituency, and non-transference of excess votes from one constituency to another. Though troubled by the lack of majority parties after 1919, they developed parties strong enough to maintain reasonably strong governments. Belgium, Finland, and The Netherlands, not using the limiting features, had much trouble with weak leading parties and with uncertain and unstable governments. But the eastern and central European nations, most of them not using the limiting features, did not develop parties strong enough to even maintain responsible government.

Under proportional representation there is no alternate governing party available. Each coalition cabinet is formed of the leading party and one or more minority parties, thus including much of the democratic strength of the parliament. The extremists, being only a destructive opposition, are not available for service in democratic cabinets. The falling government has no alternate one at hand. All that is available is the same leading party in coalition with one or more different small factions. The leading party can never be replaced, except with the extremists and the resulting end of democratic government, as we shall presently see illustrated in Germany. With no possibility of replacing the leading party, such a faltering system cannot be considered responsible to the people.

In the case of a large constituency represented by several seats, the local party organization becomes larger in size. The more seats, the larger becomes the local party unit, and the farther it recedes from the voters' direct control. In Italy after 1919 the largest constituency of 28 seats was so far from the people that its party managers could easily control the enlarged unit. Under such conditions, the parties become completely national organizations with no local units for the voters to control. The people lose their chance to back their local representatives when needed to prevent too much control of their party by its leaders and managers.

Under the free-party-list system, the party managers have control of the order of the candidates on the ballot, which largely determines the winners. They may place near the end of the ballot, for certain defeat, all members of the parliament who show any independence whatever. They may nominate and place high on the ballot their trusted cohorts. After having been placed on the ballot, the candidates share multi-member constituencies in which to campaign for the organization. The several winners jointly represent a multi-member constituency in the parliament, but they remain responsible to the party instead of to the voters. In fact, the winners owe their places, not to the voters who elected them, but to the managers who placed them at the head of the list. As a result of such biased manipulation of the ballot, the people lose their local representatives in parliament, and lose control of their parties. Lacking the single-member constituency, proportional representation has no place in responsible government.

England used three-member constituencies in some cases after 1867, but they resulted in the party caucus having too much power, and were soon discontinued. Her experience with them was limited in extent and was soon lost. In the early United States, state-wide election of congressmen was a frequent practice, but this method was abandoned shortly after 1842. France briefly used multi-member constituencies from 1885 to 1889. Italy used a similar system with from two to five seats for each constituency from 1882 to 1892, but since the practice gave politicians too much power, it was discontinued. John Stuart Mill of England, a powerful advocate of proportional representation, was opposed by Walter Bagehot a century ago, but their debate was not decisive in ending the proposed system. A large-scale experiment had to be carried out before the method could be classified as successful or unsuccessful.

The trial began in 1919, when nearly all European nations dived,

recklessly and blindly, into proportional representation's multi-member constituencies. Forecasting potential difficulty was the fact that the system had not yet been used by any major country. It soon became the most disastrous experiment in democratic history. Our work must regrettably now deal with failure after failure of responsible government.

17.

FIFTEEN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS FAIL

With the end of World War I, European peoples confidently organized responsible governments. Although many of them had been without effective votes, they had been going through the motions of electing their governments. They had developed many experienced statesmen in their parliaments. Except for high illiteracy in Albania, this was no serious problem, such as Asiatic nations are successfully facing today. There was every reason to believe that European peoples would succeed with their new governments, even though they were split into small economic units and faced heavy financial difficulties.

The new republics were organized along the lines of cabinet government except that, in some cases, the prime minister had limited power to dissolve the parliament when needed. But Europeans overlooked the fact that cabinet government, as developed in England, is based on the strong foundation of majority elections. Under this system, England forms her governing majority at the polls. But European democracies based their organizations on the shifting sands of small parties. They continued to attempt to form their majorities, not at the polls, but in the parliaments. Because of this practice, the new democracies were doomed from the start. World War I was followed by the failure of 15 responsible governments, starting with Italy in 1922, and ending in World War II, only 17 years later.

1. In 1919 Italy adopted proportional representation in intensive form with from 10 to 28 seats per constituency. In the 10-seat constituency, nearly 10 per cent of the votes are required for a party to win its first seat; while in the 28-seat one, nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent are needed. Fifteen parties won seats in the parliament. Both the Communists and the Fascists easily elected many delegates; each faction used the threat of the other to win votes. Dangerous was the fact that the leading party, the Socialists, held only 23 per cent of the seats after the elec-

tion of 1921. There was no majority party and, worse, no strong democratic one to rule.

Weak coalition cabinets replaced each other, ten of them in four years. Pressing economic problems could not be handled. In 1922 Mussolini threatened to march on the weakening government. The king had no strong party, nor strong cabinet, with which to face the Fascists. Even if Mussolini were stopped, there was no effective solution in sight.

The Fascists could be blocked; but there appeared to be no available way to form a strong cabinet. After 70 years, responsible government had suddenly become unworkable. Little wonder that, when Mussolini with a few hundred Blackshirts started his march on Rome, Victor Emanuel III turned power over to him. The extremists, unchained by proportional representation, had overthrown their first democracy. Italy had lasted only four years under the system. Her fall in 1922 was the first of 15 nations to lose their responsible governments.

2. Poland adopted proportional representation when her nation was re-established after World War I. The result was a parliament of 13 parties, of which the leading one held only 36.8 per cent of the seats after the election of 1922. There were 11 cabinets in the seven-year period. The government was so weak that Pilsudski assumed power in May 1926. But, unlike Mussolini, he did not interfere with the parliament except to appoint the cabinets as he chose. The assembly was so weak and divided that it argued and quarreled itself into disrepute. When Pilsudski dissolved it in 1935, there was little protest. Proportionality had done its disintegrating work well.

3. In the Portuguese Republic of 1910, the president was elected by the parliament, and the formerly hereditary upper chamber was switched to election by the people. The cabinet, responsible to both houses of the parliament, continued to govern. But the main fault of the monarchy continued; despite the use of majority elections, there was no strong party to rule. Forty cabinets and nine presidents crossed the scene during the next 17 years. Ending this period of futile attempts at government without strong parties, the Portuguese Republic became a dictatorship in May 1926.

4. Seven months later, Lithuania, with the usual unstable government of a proportioned parliament, and always in difficulty because of Poland's seizure of Vilna, went into dictatorship.

5. In 1928 Albania's first president, Zog, became king. This mountainous country had been given the least chance of any of the European democracies for success.

6. Yugoslavia adopted proportional representation when the nation was established after World War I. With several races and languages, she had the problem of working out, as quickly as possible, a government whose strongest policy would be compromise. The electoral system produced a parliament of eight parties, with the leading one holding only 35.2 per cent of the seats after the election of 1927. There were 23 cabinets in the ten-year period. In 1929 King Alexander assumed authority in order to prevent civil war. Thus another country had been split into many parties by proportionality, and had had no chance to develop a governing majority organization.

7. When the Weimar Republic was organized in 1919, German thoroughness carried proportional representation to an extremely dangerous degree of development. The Reichstag of nearly 600 members was elected from 35 constituencies. The smaller of these districts were grouped by twos or threes to make, along with the single large ones, a total of 16 conjoint constituencies. If a party did not win the 60,000 ballots needed for a seat in a local district, it could still win a seat in a conjoint area. Unused votes in these combined districts were collected in a national list, with additional seats being assigned on the basis of 60,000 ballots each. Under this system a party needed nearly 3 per cent of the votes to win the first seat. Of further aid to small parties, there were few unused ballots left over from local, conjoint, and national-list elections. The only limitation provided that seats assigned from the national list could not exceed the number won in the local and conjoint constituencies. Any small party could win its first seat, thus starting its career, and could then build up its strength by the effective use of all of its votes.

In the election of 1920, the Social Democrats (Socialists) failed to win a majority of seats in the Reichstag. The result was coalition cabinets, one after another, with each one including the Socialists and a variety of small parties. But the small factions, having been elected on very narrow platforms, would abandon little of their aims in order to cooperate with their larger partner. The Socialists, as the largest democratic party, were forced to participate in every cabinet, but could do little governing. As Germany drifted, they were gradually cut down from 163 seats in the 1920 Reichstag of 421, to 143 seats in the 1930 one of 577. After ten years of this futility, the Socialists withdrew from the cabinet in 1930, and responsible government came to an end.

The National Socialists (Nazis) started off after 1919 and, as a result of the promotional effect for small parties, fared extremely well. They won 2,100,000 votes and 32 seats in the Reichstag of 1924. This tem-

porary success was soon followed by a decline, with the party receiving only 800,000 votes and 12 places in the election of 1928. This should have been the end of the faction, but when the tide turns against a party, it does not lose almost all of its seats as it would under the majority system. Its number of votes and of resulting seats in the legislature merely fall a few percentage points, with the party surviving for a future chance to stage a comeback.

Political and economic conditions in the German Republic soon deteriorated dangerously, giving the Nazis their big chance. Proportionality permitted the people to split into 15 parties, of which there were five major ones. The coalition cabinets, of from three to five parties, could do little effective governing. The confusion and instability resulted in 16 cabinets in 15 years. With the effects of the world depression being weakly handled by the inactive coalition governments, millions of votes shifted to the Communists on the left and to the Nazis on the right.

It is not surprising that in the 1930 election the Communists and the Nazis between them won 31 per cent of the seats in the Reichstag. The Socialists made the colossal blunder of not backing the democratic cabinets after 1930. This action helped the Communists and the Nazis to block responsible government. The Communists made the blunder of preferring the Nazis to the democratic parties, and suffered most at the hands of Hitler. With only a minority of the parliament willing to serve in a democratic cabinet, President von Hindenburg was forced to rule by presidential decree with the approval of the Reichstag.

There followed the two elections of 1932, in which the Communists and the Nazis between them won an absolute majority of seats in the Reichstag. The Weimar Republic, unworkable since 1930, had passed beyond salvage. Von Hindenburg, dictator in fact since that year, soon passed his power to Hitler. The Weimar Republic, with five major parties and ten minor ones incapable of ruling, had failed. The extremists, unchained by proportional representation, had overthrown their second democracy, and soon they unloosed the dogs of war. Germany had finally achieved a strong party; it was elected by the people, but only Nazi candidates could stand for office.

In addition to extreme proportionality, Germany had made another error in her organization. She had forgotten France's mistake of electing Louis Napoleon by vote of the people. By this method, the German people elected Ebert in 1919 and von Hindenburg in 1925. Then in April 1932 they re-elected the latter who had stated that he would keep the "dangerous radical Hitler" out of power. But a few months

later (January 1933) von Hindenburg appointed Hitler as chancellor of Germany, and all chances of reviving responsible government were ended. Since a dependable president cannot always be successfully elected by the people, he should be chosen by their representatives.

8. Austria's parliament, badly split up by the proportional election of 1930, rapidly went into stalemate and dissolved in March 1933. Chancellor Dollfuss became a dictator only two months after Hitler's accession to office.

9. Estonia, using proportional representation, lacked a majority party to govern. She went into dictatorship in March 1934 as Fascist activity threatened her government and her independence.

10. In Latvia complete proportionality was used in the establishment of the republic. All of the 100 seats in the parliament were elected from a single constituency, with the national vote being proportioned between parties. Under this system, 1 per cent of the ballots for a party elected one seat; 2 per cent, two seats; and so forth. The election of 1931 resulted in 27 parties in the parliament of only 100 members! The leading party held 21 seats, and the next in strength 14, while twelve of them elected only a single member each. An additional 17 factions failed to elect even a single candidate. Latvia, a nation of less than 2 million people, had 44 parties in this election campaign! Little wonder that responsible government faced impossible odds there and that Fascist activity lead to the military coup of May 1934.

11. In Bulgaria, of eight parties, the strongest held only 27.7 per cent of the seats in her proportioned parliament after the election of 1931. Communist activity and the failures to the north and west made her slide into dictatorship in May 1934.

12. In Spain the dictatorship of de Rivera drew to a close in January 1930 and was followed by the brief governments of Berenguer and Aznar. The heavy republican vote in the municipal elections of April 1931 brought the voluntary exile of Alphonso XIII, and then the republic. After the elections of June, the moderates headed by the Socialists, carried out an orderly reform. But with the use of a limited form of proportional representation, the subsequent elections resulted in the center losing control of the parliament, and of both left and right parties. Each campaign brought a violent swing to left or to right.

In the election of November 1933, the conservative and center parties won control of the parliament and repealed many of the reforms of the previous government.

In the election of February 1936, the left wing took control of the

assembly, and the reforms started going back into force. In this campaign, the center lost half its strength in the assembly, while the right and the left parties moved farther apart. The two previous parliaments had faced revolutions and had overcome them; but now came the revolt of July 17 and 18, 1936 which rapidly grew into a civil war and the eventual end of responsible government. The second Spanish Republic had had 28 cabinets in five years. Its parliament, without strong parties, could no more rule than could the monarchy before it.

13. In Italy and in Germany, the Communists aided the Fascists and the Nazis in ending responsible government; but in Greece they had their chance to end it almost alone. After the election of 1936, the government coalition held 142 seats in the parliament, the democratic opposition 143, while the Communists had 15. Since, under proportional representation, parties run on narrow platforms and cannot form coalitions easily, the four democratic parties found it impossible to realign into a majority coalition. The Communists, with their 15 seats, refused to cooperate with either group. The only solution to this deadlock was the abandonment of responsible government, and the installation of a dictator. Proportionality had permitted a small percentage of the voters to elect to the parliament a non-democratic party which then blocked the will of the majority and deadlocked responsible government.

14. Rumania, with the partial use of proportioning, had enough troubles in her parliament to make the Iron Guard, a Fascist organization, a strong threat to her government. Dictatorship followed in February 1938.

Hungary finally held her first free and democratic election to the lower chamber of her parliament in May 1939. She still had to convert the upper house to popular election, or to cut down its strength, in order to bring about a fully responsible government. But the coming of World War II ended her progress toward democracy.

15. By February 1938, Czechoslovakia stood alone in Central and Eastern Europe, the last democracy of so many promising beginnings. But, under proportional representation, her end soon came.

18.

AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA SURRENDER

Among the striking features in Europe's history are the fights that small countries have put up for their independence. Switzerland strug-

gled with the Hapsburgs for decades to win her independence and to keep it. Holland behind her dikes put up a struggle to the death against Philip of Spain, and finally won her freedom. Still later she struggled gallantly against Louis XIV. England, with relatively few ships, defeated the Spanish Armada to keep her independence.

It matters not how great the odds against her, a nation fights to win and to keep her independence. Until her friends come to her aid, she will do her best alone. And so, when a country must fight for her independence against the would-be rulers of all Europe, she begins her fight for liberty alone and against tremendous odds, and her friends soon come to her aid. By their bravery, nations gain their independence and they remain free. Thus, European peoples have gained their independent nations, and have attempted to develop responsible government and individual freedom.

The key to these courageous fights of nations is, of course, their strong personal leadership. Only if courageously and wisely led, can a country put up a strong fight to win and to keep her independence. Elizabeth of England faced the Spanish Armada; William the Silent of Holland braved the power of Spain; and dozens of statesmen have led their countries against heavy odds.

In recent decades, as nation after nation has adopted responsible government, the nomination of courageous candidates has depended on the parties. With their ballots, the people elect promising candidates to the parliaments where they rise to leadership and deal with the trials that their countries face.

Prominent during World War I were the gallant struggles of little Serbia and tiny Belgium. But Europe has changed drastically since 1918. Some nations fight for their independence, but others do not. Austria and Czechoslovakia gave up without resistance, thereby giving Hitler a big boost on his course toward the domination of all Europe. What a contrast these countries made to the ones that fought for their independence through the centuries. Some new factor had been added to European organization which robbed countries of the will to resist aggression. What part did the newly adopted proportional representation play in the nations that fought for their independence, and in those which did not struggle for it in the World War II period?

Under proportionality, seniority and the party managers take over. The lists of candidates are made up with the incumbents at the top, if the manager chooses, followed by other contestants in the order he prefers. The larger the constituency, the less effect have the voters'

preferences. If an incumbent dies or retires, there is no single-member constituency in which all comers may battle for the vacant office with the best man winning. Instead, the manager chooses the replacement as he sees fit, and thus determines the winner. In this manner the managers select the members of legislatures with little interference or supervision by the voters.

Most of Europe used the free-party-list system with the voters showing their preferences for their party's candidates. But Germany and Czechoslovakia used the rigid-party-list system which gives the voters nothing at all to say about the selection of candidates. In both of these nations its use was disastrous.

Under this practice, fighting spirit is not a requirement for winning office. With no individual contest to face, any person in favor with the party managers may stand for office and, if placed high on the list, may win. The result is a parliament incapable of furnishing leaders with fighting spirit, and timid in backing their leaders when the country faces a menacing usurper or a threatening invasion. Some nations give up at the first heavy threat.

Austria was Hitler's first major victim. With four parties, of which the leading one held 42.4 per cent of the seats in the parliament after the election of 1930, coalition cabinets were the rule. There were 20 of them in the 15 years of the republic. After the election of November 1930, the difficulties of the chamber increased. With Dollfuss becoming chancellor in May 1932, the parliament reached a stalemate, with its president casting the deciding vote. After some months of this difficulty, the chamber reached a total deadlock in March 1933, and broke up.

Chancellor Dollfuss, after becoming dictator, undermined the Socialists, the trades unions, and the parliament. With the end of responsible government, the Nazis had free reign to build up strength, so as to threaten the nation's independence. Dollfuss was assassinated on July 2, 1934, but the Nazi putsch failed.

Schuschnigg came into power. Thinking it futile to attempt a return to responsible government, he installed a corporative regime. Starhemberg assumed control briefly from October 1935 to May 1936; then Schuschnigg resumed power. As Hitler's threats grew stronger, Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite of the people for independence and responsible government, or for union with Germany. But, under pressure from Hitler, this plan was abandoned two days later. Austria finally gave up without a fight. Had she been a strong democracy, she might have stalemated Hitler's steamroller near its start. As a weak

dictatorship, resulting from proportional representation, Austria fell an easy victim to Hitler's steamroller.

In the heart of Europe stands the natural fortress of Czechoslovakia, with mountains lining her frontiers. By 1938 her ring of mountains had been fortified in depth, and a strong munitions industry had been developed. Her leaders thought that she could fight a delaying action of from three to six months as she fell back from Bohemia in the west to Slovakia in the center of the nation. It was assumed that her pledged friends (France and Britain) would come to her aid. The people took it for granted that they would have a chance to fight for their homeland.

In May 1938, Hitler mobilized against this natural fortress; but the resolute stand of a well fortified and armed nation, backed by London and Paris, deterred him. However, Chamberlain and Daladier, under the continuing sword rattling of Hitler, soon decided on a policy of appeasement. In September 1938, they told Czechoslovakia that if she persisted in refusing to be partitioned, then she could expect no aid from them.

When London and Paris advised Czechoslovakia that she stood alone before Hitler's armies, her leaders lost their nerve. They gave up their fringe of mountains in the Sudetenland after a midnight meeting of two or three hours. The people assumed that their army was being mobilized to protect their homeland; but they were shocked when they found that the mobilization was for the purpose of giving up their nation's defenses. The leaders were replaced by a surrender cabinet, and the country went down without a fight.

Czechoslovakia, outwardly, had had a strong republic, but her strength was mainly in strong presidents, of whom there were two—Masaryk, and then Benes. Her proportioned parliament was split into 16 parties, with the leading one holding only 15.3 per cent of the seats after the election of 1933. The average government was a coalition of five or six parties, with cabinet after cabinet crossing the scene, 16 of them in 20 years. When Hitler threw his pressure against Czechoslovakia's supposedly strong republic in 1938, it collapsed. Her five- and six-party coalition cabinets had had only the outward signs of strength. Where was her majority party to make her strong in a crisis? Where were the statesmen who should have led her in a fight for continued independence?

Austria surrendered without a fight, and the occupying German army ran out of gasoline, arriving late to occupy Vienna. But the nations which fought, faced overwhelming force. World War II opened

with Poland's gallant struggle for survival. In the months following November 1939, Finland made her heroic stand against tremendous odds and certain defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union. Norway, Belgium, and The Netherlands fought for a few days. Alone, Greece defeated Mussolini but, with British aid, could not stop Hitler. Yugoslavia surrendered, then changed her leaders, and struggled for a few days. Of the countries which fought, only Poland remains a vassal state.

After World War II the restored republic of Czechoslovakia, with proportional representation, turned easily to Communism. In the election of 1946, the first after her restoration, more than one-third of her people voted for the Communist party. This action was probably intended as a vote of censure against Britain and France who apparently had failed them. They did not stop to ask how Britain and France could have aided their nation in 1938, unless Czechoslovakia first started her own fight, regardless of Chamberlain and Daladier.

With the Communists winning 38 per cent of the popular votes and 31 per cent of the seats in the parliament, Czechoslovakia fell easily for the second time. Instead of one or two strong democratic parties facing the Communists, there were four such organizations. Splitting up badly in typical proportional fashion, they had little chance to keep the Communists from office, and that extremist faction was included in the coalition government along with the democratic parties. Fearing a decline in strength in the coming election, the Communists seized control of the country in 1948. Under the majority system, they would hardly have been represented in the parliament at all; but under proportional representation, they took over the nation easily.

The spirit of Czechoslovakia's people has been broken by the "Great Betrayal", whatever its cause. The Soviet masters fear no serious revolt from her spiritless and hog-tied people. Not until a new generation grows up, will that nation again revive its traditional fighting spirit. When the people of Czechoslovakia do eventually start their fight for independence alone, the free world hopes that it can finally come to their aid.

19.

BELGIUM AND FINLAND FALTER

After World War I ten new nations were established in Eastern and Central Europe: Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland,

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Yugoslavia. By September 1939, only the responsible governments of Finland and Hungary (partial) remained. All the rest had failed. In addition, five established countries had lost their responsible governments: Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Rumania. From The Netherlands, France, and Switzerland eastward, only Hungary remained democratic. To the southward; Italy, Portugal, and Spain had failed. Except for Albania and Portugal, all of the failures had been using the new and untried proportional representation. Europe's ill-fated attempts to organize responsible governments based on a system which fails to develop majority-party rule, had resulted in a wholesale failure—as was all too evident.

Democracy failed in Europe after 1918 largely because of faulty organization. With the scales in delicate balance during periods of crisis in many a democracy, only perfect organization can assure the best chances of survival. Lacking efficiency in her constitution and associated laws, a democracy may operate successfully for years until she meets a crisis which her government cannot handle; then the work of years comes crashing down in ruin. Because men did not know how to organize the liberties which they had won, democracy failed to hold the ground that it had gained in 1918. Men who had fought for a free world were betrayed by statesmen who failed them, more through ignorance of successful governmental organization, than by using anti-democratic practices. In many nations, men turned back toward the rule of clever and forceful leaders. Democracy receded and was replaced by dictatorship and war. Eventually, the people of the world had to fight a second great war for the independence and freedom of nations.

Organizational failures lighted the time fuse for World War II. The absence of majority parties allowed 15 democracies to fail. Two of them, Italy and Germany, fell to extremists who pressed for war. Two of them, Austria and Czechoslovakia, with weak leadership were their first victims. The lack of a majority party in France, with falling cabinets and changing leaders, provided Hitler an easy road to conquest. The lack of a strategic-minded leader in England, which failed to prevent either World War I or World War II by a firm stand, is considered a normal peacetime condition. The failure of democracy in so many basic ways and in so many countries permitted World War II to occur. Even the surviving proportion-using nations suffered during this "unnecessary war."

From a resolute nation in 1914, Belgium became a timid one. After

1919, under proportional representation, she had 16 cabinets in 20 years. The cabinet of Pierlot was reorganized successively in February, April, and September of 1939, and again in May 1940. With four cabinet crises in a period of 15 months, democratic government had almost broken down. On King Leopold's shoulders fell the full load of keeping democracy going, even feebly.

Lacking a strong government, most of the planning on defense had fallen to the king for years. The nation's defenses depended on one-man decisions, not those of a strong, responsible government. Belgium even requested that France refrain from building the Maginot Line along her borders to the North Sea. After leaving this corridor across her territory into France, her leaders thought that she could remain neutral. Belgium, which had disastrously delayed the Kaiser on the road to Paris in World War I, opened the way to Hitler in World War II.

When the German forces overwhelmed the allied armies, and the Belgian cabinet left for London, Leopold asked for a decree to permit him to act in their absence. Although nearly without a government, they also refused him the decree. A few days later, he ill-fatedly surrendered his army at a stroke of the pen, thereby abandoning the British and French armies to added danger. The Belgian army could have helped the allies further, and possibly been withdrawn to England. We can only hope that history may some day deal more kindly with the king, who kept democracy alive by a thread for years, then alone, made his last decisions so ill-fatedly.

Finland, the lone survivor of eight new proportion-using nations, also suffered from the lack of a majority party. Her new republic was organized after World War I, continuing the use of proportional representation. She had the usual small parties, of which there were eight, with the strongest one holding 41.5 per cent of the seats in her parliament after the election of 1936. There were 16 cabinets in 21 years, of which some were composed of civil servants, and some of parliamentary leaders without party backing. Finally, during the war with the Soviet Union, Herra Risto Ryti, a former banker, became prime minister. By March 1940 Finland had been overwhelmed, despite her gallant struggle.

In the following months, instead of remaining neutral between Hitler and Stalin, Prime Minister Ryti placed his nation at the disposal of Hitler. By this action, he hoped to regain the lost territory from the Soviet Union in the impending war. President Kallio died, and Ryti automatically became president. He chose a new prime minister to

carry out his policies. The parliament was kept in the dark as to the moves with Germany, while responsible government was barely used. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Ryti, without consulting the parliament, declared war on the Soviet Union.

In a short time, Finland went down to a second defeat with the loss of more lives and territory. She incurred staggering reparation payments, and the added humiliation of a forced trial of her leaders. But where was the majority party in her parliament which should have kept Ryti from power and, failing that, should have controlled the war party and Ryti—first as prime minister and then as president?

Of proportion-using nations, only Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland were not overwhelmed by the flood of extremists. Their only companions were the dictatorships of Portugal and Spain, and majority-using democratic Turkey. Only the statesmanship of their leaders and their determination to remain out of the conflict allowed some of these nations to remain neutral during the war.

The experiences of European nations, during more than a century and a half, have shown that a parliament cannot successfully consolidate a majority government from fragments formed at the polls. A majority government must be consolidated at the polls, if it is to be formed at all. Ballots become effective only through strong parties produced by electoral systems. Voting methods often make, or break, the long-fought-for effective votes and responsible government. England achieved strong parties first, universal suffrage much later, and succeeded with her government. Even Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin have added to this lesson in successful organization. No government, whether democratic or not, will long survive without the votes of the people empowering strong parties to rule.

Though European peoples win the struggle for responsible government and for effective votes, they frequently lose the fruits of victory. Without majority elections to produce strong parties, they are robbed of successful democracy time after time. The use of the second ballot, which failed to tame the rulers of Austria-Hungary and Germany before 1914, has been discontinued. The use of proportional representation, which permitted the failure of all except one of the central and eastern European democracies after 1918, must be discontinued. The lessons of the failures must be used to improve the organization of governments. Strong parties must be made an essential part of every democracy.

Since World War II, European nations have continued their use of proportional representation with its "majority-party-killing" and "ex-

tremist-unchaining" features. Behind the Iron Curtain, proportioned elections placed many Communists in the parliaments, thus making the fall of the occupied countries easy. The nine nations which survived to 1939 under the system were: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Only four of the 14 failures have been restored to responsible government: Austria, West Germany, Greece, and Italy. In 1946 France adopted the system, thus making proportional representation continent-wide, except for Turkey and the United Kingdom. European nations have not yet put the lessons of earlier failures into practice. Their futures still depend on the operation of unsuccessful electoral systems.

Tragically, the responsible government of France failed early in 1958. Just as Italy with 15 parties failed in 1922, and Germany with 15 parties went down in 1933; so France with 16 parties failed in 1958. Under the system Italy lasted 4 years, Germany 14 years, and France 13 years. Will Germany and Italy, again using the system which led to the downfall of their democracies after World War I, go down again for the opening of a future war?

Outside Europe few countries have been foolhardly enough to adopt proportional representation. These nations include: Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, and Uruguay. All of them are having the usual difficulties with the numerous parties which the system permits. The world is fortunate that the list is so short, and we hope that all of these nations will change to the majority system and strong-party rule before any more serious failures result.

PART FIVE

PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT

20.

THE PRESIDENT'S SECRETARIES

In 1781 the Thirteen Colonies organized a central government under the Articles of Confederation. Its single-chamber congress was made up of members appointed by popularly-elected state governments. But, with the exception of Holland (1579-1794), no representative system has ever succeeded, unless at least one chamber of its legislature had been directly elected and empowered to govern by the people at the polls. The Confederation government was expected to handle only a few duties, but, with its indirectly-elected congress, it remained little more than a shadow government. If the Articles could be amended to provide for the direct election of the members of the congress by the people, the addition of a chief executive, and the gradual extension of the Confederation's powers, then a successful government could result. But, unfortunately, Poland's single veto was included in the document in the requirement of a unanimous approval by state governments of all amendments to it. Even before being signed, the Articles were doomed to failure through inaction. The next constitution required only a two-thirds approval on amendments.

After the trial and failure of the Articles of Confederation, came the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of America and the strengthening of the national government. Used for models were the several state constitutions already in existence, and the government of England which at that time was not as clearly organized and as democratic as we now know it. Thus, without any government at that time having a clearly organized responsible chief executive and cabinet, this system was not available for consideration by the Constitutional Convention. Its members thought that they were organizing along the lines of the English government, but with improvements on it. They did not correctly evaluate an immature stage of a system in the process of development, not to be materially completed until 1832. However, had we paralleled the growth of England's system, the development of

cabinet government here would only have required a change from the two-year elections to the House of Representatives to a four- or five-year maximum period between elections, with dissolution when needed. So well drawn was the Constitution, that only this amendment would have been needed in order to develop cabinet government.

The most notable omission from the Constitution was a provision for a council of state or cabinet and for its operation. Section 2 of Article II provides that "The President . . . may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices . . ." That was as close as the Constitution came to providing for a council of state or cabinet.

But cabinet government was seemingly barred by the drafters of the Constitution under Section 6 of Article I which provides that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, . . . and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." This provision would seem to prevent a member of the congress from also being a department head concurrently. This assumption does not recognize the fact that a cabinet member, under responsible government, serves on a committee of parliament operating the government for the legislature and the people. Nor does this assumption take into account the fact that a cabinet position is a more or less temporary appointment, while the permanent head of a department under his supervision remains outside the assembly. Nor that, as policy maker, administrative supervisor, and legislative programmer, the cabinet member holds a combination executive, administrative, and legislative position not covered by the Constitution.

In order to supervise the department heads, to improve the efficiency of our government, and to obtain closer coordination between executive and legislative branches, the cabinet members could be given non-voting seats in the congress, as has been proposed at times during our history. But the leaders of the congress have always feared that this practice would allow the president to infringe on the prerogatives of the legislature which in theory enjoys complete independence. Its leaders never realized that by bringing the department heads onto its floor, the congress could actually and easily gain full control of them and reduce the president to a figurehead. Although, for decades, the congress thought that the Treasury Department should come under its

control, it never got around to assuming supervision over even this one department.

Our government continues, as organized over a century and a half ago, with the department heads still responsible to a too busy president. It remains impossible for a chief executive to operate efficiently a vast organization without the direct supervision of the legislature. Even a department head cannot operate efficiently a single department of the government, scattered across the country, without the direct supervision of our representatives. Departmental responsibility and efficiency are still not a part of our government.

The department heads who make up the so-called cabinets are still chosen by the chief executive. Since he rarely replaces one, it appears that most presidents make a nearly perfect selection of them. Although an occasional shift of department heads to posts more suited to their abilities is needed, we very rarely have such a cabinet change. In order to avoid these replacements during the latter Roosevelt administrations, ineffective cabinet members, instead of being replaced, were bypassed with the heads of independent agencies doing much of their work. We lack a system of promoting able men to cabinet posts and of easy transfer and replacement of them when needed.

Having chosen his department heads, the president cannot keep them operating at top efficiency because that is physically impossible for one man to accomplish. Without the frequent and unhampered questioning of department heads by our representatives, no one can even say accurately which ones of them are doing an effective job and which ones are not. In the case of a good cabinet member who happens to let some matters slip, the congress has no opportunity to force correction by direct questioning. Occasionally, the scandals peculiar to the Grant and Harding administrations take place easily and without chance of prevention by the congress. The machinery for keeping the departments under constant and close supervision is lacking.

The absence of continual question-and-answer operations, by which a parliament clears up hundreds of small matters at their start, permits them to pile up into major difficulties. Many matters, after showing up in the press and in the congress, are corrected as the result of criticism. But many deficiencies become serious and require action by congressional committees. An investigation clears up the difficulty temporarily, only to have it pop up again after the heat goes off. Clean-up committees have gone into action in the Grant, the Harding, and probably in every administration for the past century. Since it does not clear up difficulties at the start by questioning the department heads,

the congress has a major job of cleaning up the messes after they have developed to an advanced and disgraceful stage.

Without the individual supervision of the department heads by the congress, the management of each line of activities cannot be kept consolidated into a single department. The maintaining of effective organization is up to the president. Because the entire executive and administrative branch is under his control, it matters little if, for example, agricultural affairs are at times split up into 15 or 20 agencies, with no official except the president, being held responsible for the entire field of administration. It even matters little if there are about 150 officials directly responsible to the chief executive, as during World War II, and that he cannot possibly have time to supervise their activities properly. The president may work for a well organized administrative mechanism, or he may tend towards dispersing it into a complete tangle to which he alone holds the strings. It is little wonder that since 1917 our government has been mushrooming into a fairyland of departments, bureaus, boards, commissions, and authorities.

Another difficulty in top management is the lack of a system by which our representatives can hold the president and his assistants to operation of the government without partiality. With the department heads being responsible to the president, who in turn is responsible to the people only on election day, there is no supervision to prevent bias in the administration of our nation's laws. This factor has resulted in the keeping of only the strictly administrative activities under the authority of the chief executive, while the control and regulatory activities are placed under the administration of bipartisan boards. This results in the continual expansion of agencies, thus cutting down sharply on the efficiency of the government.

Used in our organization are few of the essentials which make for efficient operation. The people can select their chief executive, but except for the small percentage of activities where public opinion reacts strongly, they have little control over him between elections. Our legislative representatives have no power to force the replacement of department heads, except for malfeasance in office, nor to keep the right man at the head of each department, nor to maintain their activities at a high level of efficiency. Neither have they the power to keep the government operating without bias, nor to maintain good organization. No wonder that during the 1930's the Inland Waterways and the Panama Canal were its only activities which were considered to be operating at a high level of efficiency.

When European nations brought the department heads or ministers under control of the parliaments, they brought each department under close and direct supervision by that body. They abandoned the one-man executive for responsible committee government. But our country has yet to make that change. Supervision of the executive and administrative branch is limited to committees of the congress reviewing the budget and selected past actions with each department head. This delayed review method has nothing like the efficiency of the day-to-day questioning of department heads. We are still using the outmoded one-man executive which Europe started abandoning nearly two centuries ago.

21.

A LITTLE USED LEADERSHIP CORPS

In the new United States, the party slate of candidates for the House of Representatives ran at large in some states with a majority vote electing the entire slate. But the demands for local representatives in the congress gradually brought election by districts to most states. In 1842, with state-wide election left in only six of them, all were required to establish congressional districts, and the campaign for each seat became an individual contest. Since then, the membership of the House of Representatives has been decided by direct vote of the people in each single congressional district. Since 1915, senators have been chosen by the people in each state or half-state. Occasionally, a congressman at large is elected in order to avoid re-apportionment of seats within the state.

Under Sections 2 and 3 of Article I of the Constitution, every member of the congress must "...be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." This constitutional provision was extended until custom now demands that a member of the House be a resident of the district which he represents. This custom strengthens the voters' control of their representatives by preventing the national parties from choosing their candidates for them. But this practice prevents the transfer of excess able candidates from their congressional districts to ones which lack capable candidates. It excludes many worthy citizens from entering political campaigns and, therefore, results in fewer able members of the congress.

Having carried local control of its members to extremes, and having kept many able men out of the congress, our system fails to pro-

vide for a chain of promotion to high office. There is no line of advancement from congress to cabinet to presidency. Lacking entirely is a system for choosing able and experienced leaders and for making their leadership as effective as possible. Many candidates for the presidency have been prominent government officials or businessmen. They were chosen chiefly for their availability, not for their ability or experience for the position. There have been elected to the presidency too many "dark horses"—men whose chief qualification was that nothing was known against them.

Among the most available candidates are the wartime military leaders who stand high in the number of candidates who have reached the presidency. We have elected Washington, Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Taylor, Pierce, Grant, Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eisenhower to the high office on the wave of personal popularity without any other specific qualification. With the selection of Washington there can be no criticism, but the rest of them bear evidence to the lack of a line of promotion to high office, even though their average records are probably on a par with those of many other presidents.

Along with their irregular choice is the impossibility of replacing a president upon his failure while in office. He fills out his term even after he has proved inadequate, as has occurred several times in our history. He is elected to office for a definite term and, for practical purposes, cannot be removed. If he turns out to be successful, he may be reelected; if he fails, the nation simply suffers until the next election.

Our organization does not differentiate between the capabilities of men for leadership in peace or in war. Theodore Roosevelt, after being chosen in peacetime, sent the fleet around the world, took the Panama Canal Zone, and shook the big stick. James Madison, elected in peacetime, did not prove to be an effective leader during the War of 1812. Providentially, all other presidents who happened to be in office when wars occurred, proved to be fairly effective leaders. If our wartime leadership proves to be weak, a change is only remotely possible before the next election.

The cabinet is not a part of a chain of promotion to the highest positions in the government. Nearly all of its members are chosen from political and business life outside the congress. Department heads, not being subject to supervision by the legislature, are rarely replaced, regardless of the lack of success in their posts. This negligence allows the cabinet to be weakly staffed. The cabinet does not

have the personnel to make it fully effective and thus remains a weak link in our organization.

The president and the department heads are very rarely trained before taking office. They must overcome this deficiency by training on their posts. They have the problem of catching up years of experience in a few months. A year or more must pass before an administration becomes really effective, but the lack of training is never fully overcome. A case of this occurred in March 1933, in the midst of our worst depression, when we inaugurated a president who had had no congressional, cabinet, or presidential experience for the position. Likewise, with the exception of Senators Hull and Swanson, the cabinet that he appointed had had no experience in congress or cabinet for their posts. It is little wonder that such an action was taken as the laying off of hundreds of government employees, only to rehire them a few weeks later.

The congress is the top of the ladder for the career statesman, with little chance of advancement to the cabinet or to the White House. Even the lifetime service of an able man in that body, very rarely results in his promotion to the cabinet or to the presidency. Such is the lack of a system for choosing our leaders from the legislature, or of giving them a minimum of training before taking office. Rarely is the right man at each post and, even if so, rarely has he had the training needed to carry out his duties most effectively.

When a chief executive or a department head retires, or a candidate for the presidency loses, he usually goes back to private life because there is no place for him in the government. When a leader in the congress fails to be re-elected, he also retires to private life. This results because he is limited to his own home district when standing for office, to be defeated in the next political turnover. In this manner we promote many able men to high office, give them a few years training, then send them back to private life. We simply have no system for keeping tried and experienced leaders active in the system. A lifetime career is not assured to anyone of ability in the high elective offices of our government.

Our potential "leadership corps" is smaller than it should be, and it plays a rather unimportant part in the foreign affairs of our country. Its members are limited to serving on congressional committees, debating on the floor, acting on legislation, and addressing the public. Their work on measures requested by the administration is largely academic, for they have rarely had first hand experience which comes only with assignment to diplomatic duties. Neither do they hear for-

eign affairs discussed fully on the floor by the president and the secretary of state. Thus they play an amateur and rather futile part in the policy making and directing of the foreign affairs of our nation.

Our diplomacy is handled, not by veteran statesmen, but by presidents and secretaries of state, who have usually had little previous experience for the operation. Needless to say, each new administration must spend the first year or so in office in intimately learning the state of affairs of the nation in its relation to the world. By the time they have become acclimated to their posts and are beginning to put their policies into operation, they are faced with an election which, all too often, replaces them. Thus we have a cycle of uncertain foreign policies during the start of an administration, followed by mild ones growing gradually firmer toward their end, and then being replaced by those of another administration which repeats the vicious cycle. As a result, we have little definite foreign policy much of the time, with a long-term policy rarely being possible. During the few periods when we do have such a policy, it is the one-man action of the president of the moment, and not the broad stable ideals of the people as reflected through their representatives in a leadership corps.

Remarkable have been the results of a neglected leadership corps, and the use of patronage which undermines a career diplomatic service. Lacking the continuous application of long-term policies by a leadership corps and a career diplomatic service, it was impossible for this country to have the foreign office actions of pre-1918 European nations. We barely got up headway enough to take the Hawaiian Islands but grabbed territory from Mexico and Spain. We have remained a rarity among nations, a big country without an aggressive foreign office.

Thus the machinery of our government fails to create or to carry out a long-term foreign policy for this nation. Deploring the imperialism of other countries, we have nevertheless slipped into their ways at times. We saw the Trans-Siberian, the Capetown-to-Cairo, and the Berlin-to-Bagdad railways promoted, but we failed to obtain a railway from the United States to Alaska, and, as a substitute, pushed a highway through during World War II. Living in a world of democracies, of dictatorships, and of expanding empires, where war frequently occurs, with this country being occasionally involved, we have rarely been prepared for our wars.

Though wanting to remain at peace, we have not had the expert leadership needed to direct our foreign affairs and as a result we have become involved in two world wars. As late as the ambassadorship

of Walter Hines Page in London during World War I, we rented our embassy there, and could not keep secret even the most vital diplomatic information received in Washington. Being a leading advocate of peace, we nevertheless failed, through the Senate, to join the League of Nations which might have prevented World War II. The problems of peace call for the forming of long-term policies and for the greatest expertness and experience in carrying them out; but methods to produce these qualities are lacking in our internal organization. We present to the world a powerful advocate of peace, but an inexperienced and blundering one, not capable of usually effecting that happy result.

22.

THE OBSOLETE STRONG PRESIDENT

The drafters of the Constitution did not know that kings would continue to reign where permitted, but eventually, nowhere would they rule. They did not know that although presidents would replace kings as heads of nations, neither would they have authority. The drafters assumed that the chief executive would be the actual governing head of our country, and so gave him all the powers necessary for a ruling head of that period. Included were powers not today granted to responsible kings and presidents. The chief executive was allowed to choose his department heads without recommendation by the congress, but the Senate's approval of appointments was required. He was allowed to sign official documents without the countersignature of the leaders of the congress. Although legislative acts are signed by the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House, this does not cover all official documents. The chief executive was made, and continues to be, a strong president.

Thus the chief executive was made responsible for the executive branch of the government, while the congress was given legislative and related duties, with little joint actions of the two being provided for. The resulting system of "checks and balances" was originally designed to prevent either the executive or the legislature from having too much power. That this organization might result in the president and the congress stalemating each other into inaction, did not concern the drafters of the document. They were more concerned with preventing the existence of too much power, and the misuse of it, than they were with assuring speedy and sure action by the government.

The one-man executive was subjected to approval of his every legislative request by a congress, not of one chamber, but of two. Every proposal must be approved by majority action of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. Power was spread over the entire congress, with the president having no effective instrument of enforcing cooperation. In the case of treaties, which must be passed by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, control was dispersed even farther. Power was thereby distributed very widely indeed as compared to one-man government, or to a 10- to 15-member cabinet committee. If the chief executive were to carry out effective government, he must bring about closer coordination with the legislature.

Had the congress gained control of the department heads, then a union of executive and legislative powers in the cabinet would have resulted. However, failing to develop a union of powers at that level, it had to be brought about through the office of the president, with the parties making it possible. The chief executive became head of a party, and added its influence to his authority in pushing his program through the congress. Thus the union of powers developed in the presidency. As party leader and chief executive, his success depends on his political ability in controlling his party, and in inducing its members in the congress to cooperate with him. But no system has ever been developed for nominating and electing to the presidency an experienced politician to handle the parties.

The Constitution provides for the election of the chief executive by the people through electors, but makes a major omission in not including a method of nominating candidates for the office. The congress made up the deficiency for a time by using party caucuses of its members to make the nominations. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth presidents had been secretaries of state in preceding administrations. The method produced a major failure in Madison's conduct of the War of 1812. Then in 1824 the congress' choice of Crawford proved unacceptable to the politicians, and the caucus method of making nominations broke down. Since then, the congress has been out of the picture as far as presidential nominations are concerned.

With the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, party machines organized all the way down to the grass roots, became the coordinating agencies of the government. Nomination and election of the president, the vice-president, and the members of the congress fell to the party machines and their managers. The national party conventions, which nominate candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, began in 1832. However, the system depends heavily on always

having a majority party to win each election, and to rule. If the parties weaken or break down, the absence of a majority organization can disrupt a united nation. In the 1860 campaign, the Democrats did split, and the absence of a majority party had disastrous results for our nation.

Let us examine this election in detail in order to find out why our organization allowed a civil war to occur. With the slavery-abolitionist split growing on the scene from 1819, and becoming more acute as we approached 1860, there were serious consequences in the offing if the government were not well organized and able to cope with this issue at all times. When in 1860 the new and virile Republican party opposed the further expansion of slavery and nominated Abraham Lincoln, the showdown was on. Had the pro-slavery and moderate forces in the Democratic party continued as a combined organization, they might have remained in power. But when the issue was joined in this election, the Democrats split, with the pro-slavery forces backing John C. Breckenridge and the moderates backing Stephen A. Douglas. To make matters even worse, the remnants of the Whigs and the Know-Nothings formed the Constitutional Union party and nominated John Bell. The votes were as follows: Lincoln—1,866,000 Douglas—1,376,000; Breckenridge—849,000; Bell—588,000. The electors, very efficiently, gave a majority to the leading candidate. Had they not done so, the election would have been passed to the congress, with a possible avoidance of a civil war.

An analysis of the votes shows that the moderates, backing Douglas and Bell, outvoted the Republican candidate Lincoln. Furthermore, since the abolitionists made up only part of the Republican party, the moderates cast a clear majority of ballots in this election. Under a properly organized government, they would certainly have had a good chance to keep both extremes in check until slavery faded out of the picture, which historians think would have occurred in a matter of fifteen to twenty years. But because the electoral system gave the presidency to a minority candidate, and an extreme one at that, civil war resulted.

Electing a president by vote of the people is absolutely dependent on a two-party system. Only with two of them can a majority vote for a candidate be guaranteed. When a critical issue dominates an election campaign, only a candidate whom the defeated minority will accept peaceably should be elected. The experience of 1860 indicates that the showdown of choosing a president by vote of the people should be avoided entirely. Events prove that democracy has prob-

lems enough with a cabinet committee, without attempting the extremely delicate operation of an 1860 presidential election.

The breakdown of the Democratic party need not have been serious, had there been the possibility of a coalition government. But in our organization, a single president is responsible for our administration. Though the department heads are collectively called a cabinet, they are merely a group of administrative assistants and advisers to the chief executive. They are not a cabinet in the British sense of committee action and authority in responsible government. Therefore, when a coalition government is needed, as here in 1860, it is not possible under our organization.

Immediately after the Civil War and the death of Lincoln, the congress attempted to rule. Andrew Johnson appears to have been another outstanding case in which our hit-or-miss electoral system did not produce an able politician when one was seriously needed. Johnson used poor strategy which allowed the congress to slip out of control and almost remove him from office by impeachment proceedings in 1867. This impeachment trial demonstrated that the head of a nation chosen by the people (even as vice-president) is difficult to remove except by vote of the people at the next election, or by revolution. The removal of a president by impeachment has never again been attempted. A president is removed only by death, by resignation, or by the next election.

Grant, following Johnson in office, allowed the congress its way. This was its last chance to win the contest for power, and to bring about cabinet government. But, since custom had long ago barred the department heads from its floor, congressional control of them could not be consolidated.

Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln had built up the executive to a strong position. Though the power was not used by intervening weak presidents, the inherent power of the chief executive remained. Published in 1884, Woodrow Wilson's book was called, possibly correctly, *Congressional Government*. But other strong presidents followed: Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson himself, and Franklin Roosevelt. In their hands came the start of big government, followed by its great extension after 1933, to clinch the preponderance of the executive and to make our organization decisively a presidential government. Though there have been both active and inactive presidents, no longer is the executive weak.

The United States has continued to be the victim of one-man's varying ability. On the president of the moment, depends the ef-

fectiveness of the administration. A Franklin Roosevelt runs the government through his ability as statesman and politician. Average men achieve fair operation during less active times. The Grants and the Hardings fail dismally during their terms in office. On the man in the White House continues to depend the excellence or the pooriness of the administration. A century after Europe began abandoning one-man government and its variabilities, our nation still hangs on the hope that "a strong president can straighten out affairs for us."

PART SIX

SEMI-INDEPENDENT CONGRESSES

23.

THE GOVERNING PARTY MACHINES

When our federation was first organized it was not known that representative government would become party government, with the organizations outlined in constitutions becoming merely the top levels of party systems. It was thought that our government would be operated without parties, or in spite of them. Overlooked was the beginning of one-party cabinets in England in 1693 almost a century earlier. During the first Washington administration, the growth of parties rendered a two-party cabinet unworkable, with an all-Federalist cabinet resulting. These political organizations had come to stay, and to become an essential and important part of our political system.

With the death of Alexander Hamilton in 1804, the Federalist party became virtually leaderless, while the unpopular Alien and Sedition Laws hastened its decline and disintegration. Under Thomas Jefferson, the Republican party (later Democratic) came into control on a wave of popularity in 1801 and, under that political genius, was used in governing effectively. But the presidents who followed Jefferson could not equal his performance. Under Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, our government drifted without effective political organization. The party, as first organized, could not play a dominant role in our system. Something new in its organization would have to be developed.

From the State of New York came the beginnings of our present political organizations. The constitution of 1777 provided for a board of appointments composed of the governor and four senators. Available was the machinery which made the growth of the party machine possible and easy. Through Alexander Hamilton came the use of patronage in operating such an organization to defeat Aaron Burr. De Witt Clinton, after his election in 1817, was the last governor of New York to neglect the exercise of patronage in operating the state government. The State of New York went on to develop the state

party machine under control of the boss and the professional politician with their patronage peddling, and attendant corruption and graft. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the patronage or spoils system had spread to the rest of the country. The base of our national parties eventually became, in varying stages of development, 48 state party machines under the control of one or more bosses.

The year 1800 saw the beginnings of Tammany Hall and of its long career. As our population swelled in the late 1800's and the big cities grew, party machines took control of their municipal governments. Tammany Hall was followed by the Pendergast, the Hague, and other notorious machines in our large cities. These corrupt party machines made municipal government the darkest failure of our political system. Down to the present time, they have made democracy a farce in some cities, though they do not interfere seriously with our civil liberties.

With the first Jackson administration of 1829, came the extensive use in the national government of "patronage" and "rotation in office," the filling of political offices by members of the party in power. Deserving party men are rewarded for their services in controlling elections for the machine. Eventually developed was the practice called "senatorial courtesy," under which many governmental positions are filled from names suggested by the senator or congressman from that particular district. The chief executive at last had an effective weapon for inducing the members of his party in the congress to cooperate with him in his policies for operating the government. However, the system depends on the president being an expert politician, capable of dealing with 48 confederated state organizations, and of using patronage to secure the backing needed to carry out his plans and legislative program.

The growth of the state party machines and the use of patronage was accompanied by the development of the national nominating conventions. Every four years, party chairmen call the meetings of their respective national conventions, each of which is composed of an apportioned number of machine-selected delegates from each state and territory, chosen for the purpose of nominating candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. After being elected, the new president distributes patronage to the winning confederation. National committees with the power to call the conventions were added, starting with that of the Democratic party in 1848. Our governing political organizations had reached maturity.

Since the party in office in the national government controls patron-

age and the influence of power politics, much strength is withdrawn from the party out of office. The out-party must depend on positions and jobs in state and local governments in the sections where it dominates the political field. When the in-party is very strong, predictions of the underdog's decline and extinction are often made. However, it retains enough governmental positions to remain in existence and to come back and win a national election eventually. With the predominance of one party and the slim existence of the other, there seems to be room for only two successful party organizations under the majority system, and the two-party system is maintained. Since there is room for only two parties, and only a national confederation of state organizations can reasonably hope to gain power, there is little room for "third parties."

Originally, the electors voted individually for candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency. But by 1836, each state, except South Carolina, cast electoral votes as a block for its winning party. The weaker organization in each state lost its chance to win any part of the electoral votes. A state going heavily for one party for a considerable period would, under ordinary conditions, be written off as hopeless without more than a token campaign. Presidential elections are fought mainly in close or pivotal states, with the South, from 1860 until comparatively recent years, being lost to the two-party system.

Although the spoils system has been moderated, and the government employees under Civil Service have been limited in their political activities to the mere exercise of the ballot by the national government and by a few states, the spoils system still plays an important part in our political life. While most national governmental positions are now filled through impartial civil service procedures based on merit, most state and local appointive positions are not so filled. These available state and local positions still feed the party machines, thus enabling them to exist and to operate. So long as a semblance of patronage exists, our professional party machines will remain.

A major development has been the increase in elective offices. With the party machines being undependable, we have not been able to limit elections to the few positions of governors, lieutenant governors, and legislators in the state governments, along with mayors and city councilmen in local units. Elective have become state treasurers, commonwealth attorneys, judges, and many other officials. The voters have enough to tax their resources in picking a satisfactory candidate for a single office in each tier of government, but they fail when called upon for additional ones. Keeping track of the performance of more

than one or two officials simply decreases the voters' effectiveness and increases the control of the party managers. These experiments have, of course, brought little improvement in our system. The trend has now swung back toward the original few elective offices, as party machines have been partially cleaned up.

Before the general elections for many governmental positions, a primary is held by one or by both party machines. In these pre-election runoffs, the voters choose between the organization's slate of candidates and other aspirants. The winner carries the party name in the following general elections. In the primaries, most government employees of the organization and their friends and followers vote, but few other citizens go to the polls. The voters then choose between the two party-machine candidates in the general elections that follow. These organizations still have a more or less free hand in naming their candidates, whose names will be placed on the ballots under the party name in the general elections and chosen for office by the people.

We have organized a government which elects a majority president and vice-president, and usually gives them a majority party in at least the House of Representatives. However, without the power to dissolve that body and to call on the people for renewed backing, the chief executive must use a substitute method for putting his proposals through the congress. Payoff, in the form of jobs and favors, must often be used, just as in France, Italy, and all countries where the dissolution instrument is little used. The development of a career civil service based on merit, with the resulting cutting down of patronage, gives sporadic signs of transferring the payoff to income-tax cuts, gifts, and other forms of favors which are available.

Without the power of a president to dissolve a congress and to enforce its backing, we do not have a one-party government in power. The chief executive and a majority of the congress are both usually of one party, but its members in that body seldom hold to strict party lines. Each measure, as it comes up for approval, has members of each party voting for it, and against it. Thus the actions of the congress are not the work of one party, and though the one in the White House usually receives the credit or the blame for the performance of the government, neither party is solely responsible for the actions of the legislature.

We have the nomination of candidates and election of the president by 48 confederated state party machines cooperating through national conventions and national committees. Patronage is used to control the congress on much of an administration's program. The chief

executive spells out the issues to the people and develops popular opinion to influence the congress to act favorably on larger matters. The party organizations act as national units on general issues, but as 48 state party machines on small matters. The organized pressure groups complete the picture.

24.

OPEN HOUSE FOR PRESSURE GROUPS

With no elections being fought on the basis of supporting a cabinet, each member of the congress is subject to individual purge by the voters for his action on any single measure before the body. His overall voting record on measures in support of the president is not decisive. With strong pressure groups to be reckoned with, a congressman may take a firm stand on but relatively few issues, and then only when they are overwhelmingly popular at home. This may occur in the case of a member from an almost exclusively farming district, in which case he may strongly advocate an agricultural measure which the voters will approve. But for most of the members, strong stands may not be safely taken, because a single indiscreet action on a measure may end a congressional career with the next election. Thus, with the members of the congress not being held to support the government by a threat of possible dissolution of that body, followed by an election held on the basis of supporting the president, each member may vote on each bill or resolution as appears most likely to increase his prospects of re-election.

One of the results of this condition is a peculiar factor called "election year." In such a year, a member of the congress must use considerable discretion in acting on measures dealing with taxes, tariffs, labor legislation, social benefits, and many other matters, because an issue may be created in his home district or state, which will bring his defeat at the polls in the next contest. But in an "off-election year," a member has a little more latitude in acting on measures, since the voter's memory is short. This varying performance of the congress from election year to off-election year results in some legislation, even if seriously needed, being delayed for a year or more.

Another term familiarly known as the "pork barrel" applies to the expenditure of public funds for various public works projects throughout the nation. A good record on money allocated to his home district helps to assure a member's re-election. This results in

projects being approved and timed, not according to the needs of our economy, but for their effect on coming elections. These ill-considered projects are enacted by what is commonly called "log rolling" agreements among interested members to swap votes on such measures. The 1948 session of the congress passed a measure supplying funds in the amount of nearly one billion dollars. This action disregarded the fact that the construction would compete for materials with the European Recovery and rearmament programs, and would result in driving prices even higher.

Since his re-election may depend upon a member's promoting higher tariffs for the principal business, industrial, or agricultural activity in his home district, his stand on this issue is extremely important. If he wishes to show a good record of action on measures to benefit his constituents, he must support high tariff rates on products from his home district. Then, in order to enact them, he must cooperate with other members on their high rates for other items, regardless of the general economy at large. Because of this factor congress can raise tariffs, but it can rarely lower them by its own efforts. If it wishes the thousands of rates adjusted for maximum effect on foreign trade, it must delegate the power of adjusting them to the chief executive, or to an "independent" agency, such as the Tariff Commission.

Since a member's re-election may depend on his vote on taxes, the congress has difficulty in raising them, but can reduce them in quick order, with the indorsement of, or over the veto of, the president. During the early years of World War II, we saw the reluctance of the congress to increase taxes to support the war effort. In January 1942, President Roosevelt requested an increase, with which the congress complied in October of the same year. In January 1943, he requested another increase, to which the congress responded in March of the following year. Had taxes been increased promptly and as heavily as practical, we would today probably have a much smaller national debt.

Almost as serious has been the liberality of the congress in reducing taxes. With prices nearly stabilized by May 1948, that body enacted, over the president's veto, a measure reducing income taxes by 5½ billion dollars yearly. With the volume of purchasing power in the public's hands increased by that amount, but with little increase in the volume of goods produced, prices consequently took another marked rise. An overruling of the president's veto on tax reduction had helped inflation along.

With the chief executive's lack of adequate control of legislation,

and with the individual members of the congress being open to all kinds of pressures, the unique practice known as "lobbying" results. This kind of influence is frequently seen in the measures which various lobbies are said to have effected either in passage or in non-passage. There are said to be some 150 of these lobbying groups maintained in Washington. Many efforts have been made to regulate them, but with only meager results. These attempts at control are doomed to failure from the start, since lobbying is a result, and not a cause. So long as our representatives have individual voting discretion, lobbying will remain an important feature of our congress.

When an economic, financial, or defense crisis demands immediate or severe measures, the congress usually faces extreme difficulty in acting. The delay in passing legislation, usually two months or more, permits all of the opponents of a measure to organize to block it. Thousands of messages come to the members of the congress from a suddenly vociferous public. With the citizens who approve of a bill seldom making their wishes known, this creates a false impression on the assembly and prevents it from acting readily or easily. Because turning down such measures involves no immediate penalties to the members who act against them, they vote down such bills freely and frequently. This is the principal reason why the congress finds it so difficult to pass national draft acts and other such legislation, and impossible to pass a universal military training law.

During the recent Roosevelt administrations, it was extremely interesting to watch the preliminaries to the passing of a measure. A trial balloon was sent up in the form of a speech by a member of the cabinet. If the resulting public reaction was unfavorable, the speaker had simply given his personal views, certainly not those of the administration. However, if the public reaction was favorable, then support was built up to the point where the measure could be presented to the congress and passed. This, of course, resulted in an uncertain and slow pace in the government's actions, which is entirely unsuitable to meet emergencies.

During wartime the congress finds it extremely hard to "get tough." Though many measures to promote the war effort are enacted, severe ones face too many hurdles to be promptly passed, if at all. For this reason, during World War II, we added the war measures to our peacetime production but never really got down to total effort. Total war action is hardly possible by our present organization, regardless of its urgency.

The end of World War II saw the beginning of pressure to end

all wartime controls. The opposition to price controls progressed to the point that, in 1946, it achieved their removal. They were largely ended, despite the fact that production had not caught up with demand. The rise in prices has been more severe since the end of the war than it was during the hostilities. Our government could control prices during wartime, but could not control them in peacetime.

Such is the lack of buffers between the people and their government. Public opinion must be built up before action can be taken on many important measures at issue. On badly needed legislation, the strong backing needed to enact it cannot always be built up, and only ineffective action can be taken. In some cases the administration must act; but the congress, responding to public pressure, overrules the president to our nation's harm.

This lack of buffers plays an extremely important part in the payment of public funds to millions of individual voters. Since the reelection of a member of the congress may depend on his position on such measures, they are passed with ease and with dispatch. The history of such hasty actions is only too well known to anyone following the news over the past few decades.

The end of a war, with the disabled veterans and the dependents of the war dead already provided for, sees the start of a parade that in a few years places all veterans, regardless of physical condition, on full pension benefits. The creeping increase in pensions became so marked in the 1930's, that a group of veterans organized to expose the greed of their comrades' organizations, and to point out to the people the heavy load that would eventually be placed on the taxpayer, including the veteran himself, in years to come. At the present time lifetime benefits are being paid to over 2½ million veterans and dependents of the war dead, and their number is still growing.

With the growth of our economic system and the attendant social-welfare systems, two large classes of benefit receivers have been added since 1929, thus swelling the total of such individuals enormously. These are pensions to the aged and relief to the unemployed who are growing in number and in cost to our financial system.

By 1956 we had over 6 million persons drawing old-age pensions and assistance. As the program is gradually extended to cover all persons over 65, there may eventually be double that number on the rolls. Our aging population will further increase these figures somewhat during the coming decades. And, from time to time, plans are mentioned to reduce the retirement age to 60, to 55, and even to 50, with the resulting rise of many millions of pensions to the aged.

Up to the present time the social security tax has paid the way for these pensions, but this line may not be held.

During the 1930's we had never less than 7 million unemployed. This level, or higher, may occur again when normal conditions return. Although the social security tax has paid for this expense, unemployed relief at times presents a serious load on our financial system during average peacetime conditions.

To these groups, must be added the growing number of national government employees. Though they are forbidden by law from taking an active part in politics, party promises of more pay and better working conditions make them a powerful force at the polls. The two and one-quarter million employees of the national government are indeed a force to be reckoned with in the payment of public funds to individuals.

The total salaries and benefits of these four groups add up to many billions of dollars; but worse, they add up to a heavy proportion of our voters drawing salaries and benefits from the public treasury. This steady increase of citizens on salaries and benefits places them in an increasingly important position at the polls. We are rapidly reaching the stage of having 25 per cent or more of the voters receiving such payments, and of our representatives no longer being able to act with proper discretion on their appropriation. It is little wonder that measures providing for payments to at least one of these large groups (the veterans) have at times been passed over the president's veto. When that stage is reached, then the power of proposing and enacting these expenditures must be limited in some manner.

However, with the unrestricted power of members of the congress to propose such measures, and the almost certain defeat at the polls of the members who act against them, there seems to be no possibility of controlling these expenditures. The only brake seems to be the committee system which kills many proposed bills that most members, wishing re-election, cannot vote against on the floor of the congress. How a balance can be kept, between a sound financial position of the government and the salaries to employees and payments to worthy voters, is an unsolved problem.

An examination of the growing proportion of the national budget going into salaries and benefits to individual citizens shows its progress. Our voters have the power to ruin the government financially. Only their restraint can save us from total financial disaster. But their professional organizations have little moderation, since only success

keeps them in existence. Nothing, not even the president's veto, stands in the way.

25.

CONGRESS DELEGATES INADEQUATE POWER

The Constitution provided for two chambers of the congress; namely—the House of Representatives elected by the people, and the Senate elected by the state legislatures. The Senate was designed to give all states equal representation, and to limit the possibly too impulsive and democratic House of Representatives with its 12-per-cent manhood suffrage of 1789. Under the resulting organization, the Senate soon became the defender of states' rights.

Slavery did not hold a very disruptive potential in the early United States. But the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 soon made cotton and slavery more important. Slavery rapidly spread west into Texas, and north into Kentucky and Missouri. The slave states would not tolerate a strong national government regulating their internal affairs. Moreover, whether slave or free, none of the new western states over the Alleghanies would tolerate a strong government of any kind, whether local, state, or national. After 1803, when Ohio came into the Union, the Southern and Western states, with voting control of the Senate, blocked all moves of a would-be strong national government. The only congressional action that caused serious difficulty was the Tariff Act of 1828, which provoked South Carolina's nullification action. Then in the 1850's, the railways tied the North and the West together, and the Union could survive. The Senate had helped to preserve the Union.

Since the Civil War, states' rights has seldom become a critical issue; since 1933, it has been sharply cut back. But there has developed no way to end the two-chamber difficulties of the congress. Thus far, the only improvement has been the XVII Amendment of 1915, which changed the election of senators from the indirect method by state legislatures to the direct vote of the people; but this change has made little improvement in the coordination of the two houses of the congress.

If cabinet government evolves, the House of Representatives will become the only chamber of the two with effective power, since the smaller his district, the closer a representative is to his voters and the more powerful he becomes. If the Senate blocks the will of

the House, the resulting fall of the cabinet, followed by an election in which the people back up the cabinet and the House, will end the power of the Senate. The filibusters, the one-third vetoes on treaties, and the occasional majority control by a party not in control of the House, will become harmless.

The legislature holds equal and coordinate position with the chief executive in theory; but their relative positions vary in practice. A congress often backs a strong president almost to the strength of a prime minister; but, for the greater part of the time, its support of a weak chief executive declines almost to the point of stalemate in the operation of the government. The congress cannot lead, as was shown during the Johnson administration, nor can it make up for the lack of action by a weak president. It is an organism which varies in its effectiveness with the leadership and drive which it receives from the chief executive of the moment.

The procedure of doing business in a congress is the reverse of that in a parliament. A measure on first reading is ordered printed and is placed on the calendar for second reading. When that occurs, it is assigned to a committee which gives it preliminary action. The committee may pigeonhole the measure, return it to the floor with an adverse recommendation, or return it to the floor, as is, or seriously altered, with recommendation for passage. When returned to the floor, the measure is placed on the calendar for a third reading, and when that occurs, major debate takes place. If rejected, the legislation is usually dead for that session. If amended, a bill does not return to committee for redrafting, but stands as amended, even if the wording of the amendment be faulty. If accepted, a measure then proceeds to the other house for similar action, with a compromise often being necessary between the two houses.

Under this system, committees handle measures and do most of their work before major debate on the floor has taken place. Since the committees have no definite idea as to whether their work will be accepted by their house, by the other house, or by the president, they work on legislation with considerable uncertainty. They prepare each measure to the best of their abilities, but with any eye to satisfying the other units which will coordinate to make it law. But, with a large proportion of their work being amended by either house, or rejected entirely, a considerable proportion of their time and effort is wasted.

A proposed measure receives its first and second readings promptly, but may be held indefinitely by a committee and, if returned to the

floor for a third reading, is placed on the calendar in order with all other bills. A measure requested by the president, in addition to not receiving major action on second reading, does not usually receive priority over bills not requested by him. Delayed action thus runs to many weeks, months, and even years. If he wishes his complete program acted upon, the president must place as much of it as possible before the congress early in the session so that all of it may receive consideration. With many bills on the way through the mill, and with their fates not certain until final action, the progress of legislation through the congress presents a confusing picture to everyone in and out of the government.

Since a measure requested by the administration does not carry a vote of confidence under any circumstances, the congress acts freely upon it. Wholesale changes may make a bill unsuitable, but it must be accepted by the president in lieu of no legislation at all. Each measure as it comes to a vote, faces not only its own opposition, but also, that of all bills before the house, with the resulting log-rolling or minority blocking. The collective opponents of all pending legislation must be satisfied with the measure under consideration before they will permit it to pass. In this manner many bills fail to receive congressional approval and are defeated. When that occurs, there is simply a stalemate on legislation with only the possibility of the next election improving the coordination of the executive and the legislature.

Much legislation is rejected by the congress, year after year until, after the wasting of much time and effort, some crisis forces its passage. Congressional rejection of a measure means little, since many of them are reintroduced until they are finally enacted into law. A case of this type was the St. Lawrence Seaway, a project which would have been authorized by any other country years ago. It was proposed for at least three decades until it was finally passed in 1954.

Lacking a cabinet with definite policies to back, the congress rarely splits along conservative and liberal lines. Normally, about the only difference between parties is that the "Ins" are trying to stay in office, while the "Outs" are trying to get into office. Until recently the liberal Democratic Party was usually frozen into a conservative position by its Southern wing. Only when it received a big majority, so as to overcome its own conservatives, did it take liberal action. Under normal conditions, with liberal and social welfare legislation having little chance of enactment, we had a serious stalemate on such legislation in the national government until 1933.

Without the possibility of frequent and routine questioning of department heads by members of the congress, prompt action in all fields of legislation is not carried out. A complete review of the government's actions is not provided for by our organization. Without a provision for prompt and easy passage of measures needed by the administration, most lines of activity fall far behind their needs. The result is a long legislative lag, something on the order of 15 to 20 years in many lines of activity. England's labor crisis occurred in 1925, but ours did not come until 1946. Our national social welfare legislation was 20 years behind in 1933. Our railways, almost alone in the world, have not been consolidated into a limited number of systems a generation after this has been accomplished by most other countries.

Without the organized coverage of all fields of action, at every session of the congress, the long legislative lag results in minor legislation piling up to become major backlogs in all too many cases. Many affairs, which could be handled periodically as minor ones, make the legislative job more difficult. Many matters which could be dealt with during periods of lull in governmental affairs, have to be handled later as major actions during difficult times. With the big backlog on hand, dealing with a major crisis requires a large number of measures to be passed in a short period.

When an economic crisis occurs, the congress faces a mountainous pile of work to execute in a short period. In 1933, with years of back legislation to pass in a single session, that body had to speed up and drop the deliberate routine of procedure on many measures. Some bills were enacted with many members voting on them by number, not even knowing the names of the measures, much less their contents. This has been appropriately termed by its political opponents a "rubber-stamp" congress.

Congressional party leaders have influence but no power, since they may not dissolve the body when it does not follow their leadership. In acting on legislation, each member is on his own without restraints, except for the next election. The members act with considerable liberty on each measure, and on each clause of it, with no obligation to replace rejections with legislation just as effective. They nominally have individual power, but actually they have little of it. Instead of acting simply as representatives of a party, they vote as delegates of local areas and of pressure groups.

Though it is called the national Congress, the assembly acts as representatives of local communities and pressure groups. It does not

transmit anything like maximum power from the people to the chief executive.

26.**MAXIMUM POWER NOT DEVELOPED**

The list of the chief executive's powers is impressive. Theoretically, under the system of checks and balances, he holds power equal to that of the congress. However, his effective power and influence depend on his skill and success as majority party leader in influencing the congress to cooperate with him. His control varies, as does his ability and personality, from administration to administration. This fluctuating coordination between the executive and the legislature results in the president receiving an estimated three-fourths of his program, with considerable variations above and below the average, and with some measures being passed over his veto from time to time. A president has less effective working power than that of a prime minister and cabinet.

The chief executive's coordination with the legislature is not specifically organized in the government due to the separation of powers in the system. With endless possibilities for disagreement between the president, the two houses of the congress, and the people, a divided front is presented on many issues, with uncertainty on foreign affairs being a serious handicap to the government. Coordinating terms of office would minimize any differences of party lines between the president and the majority party in the congress, which have occurred 14 times in our history after mid-term elections. But this would not eliminate the differences between the people and their government during these two-year periods. Concurrent terms of office would not have avoided the difficulties between Andrew Johnson and the congress. A high degree of coordination can rarely be brought about under our present organization.

With the chief executive being not only the official head of the government but also the operating head, his replacement is almost impossible, even though the Constitution provides the machinery for it. Andrew Johnson could not be replaced, even though a majority of the congress, for good or for evil, desired his removal. Though Lord Asquith, prime minister of England, retired in 1916 after the death of his wife, Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States, did not retire under the same circumstances. When in 1919 Wilson

was incapacitated by illness, the nation was without an effective chief executive for months, but there was no remedy for the dilemma.

When economic or financial difficulties arise, and their development deepens without prompt and adequate action by the government, there is no remedy for the situation, except to wait for the next election. In the case of the economic recession which began in October 1929, although the people indicated their dissatisfaction with the government's performance by their vote in the congressional election of November 1930, there was no possibility of changing the chief executive until March 1933. The new administration, instead of being able to deal with a mild recession soon after its beginning, was obliged to tackle a major depression three and one-half years after its start. Such an accumulation of burdens should not be allowed to devolve on a newly elected government.

When severe economic or financial crises occur, or our country is forced into war, coalition government is not possible. Because the cabinet members are only the president's secretaries or advisers, they may not act as an executive committee, but may only act individually through him. Even though members of both parties hold cabinet positions, as during World War II, we still have a one-man government. Though we back such administrations automatically, they are not the strongest ones that could be organized. Thus we must go through critical times without the benefit of an all-party government.

The changing of administrations often brings in a seriously inexperienced president and cabinet. "Changing horses in midstream" during wartime stands as election propaganda's worst feared event that can happen to us, but so far we have avoided this difficulty. Since a new administration takes much time to fully learn its duties and to adopt adequate policies, we are fortunate that a replacement has only occurred once. The death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945, near the end of World War II, brought the only such change so far, but this event did not replace the party in office.

When wars or other difficulties call for the delegation of unusual power to the presidency, the legislature hesitates because the machinery is not organized to supervise and to keep that authority under control. When the congress was called upon to set up an agency to administer atomic energy, it found considerable difficulty in arranging the matter to its satisfaction. When it comes to delegating power, such as a draft for national service during World War II, it often cannot arrange the matter at all.

The congress finds the delegation of authority difficult because it

is being granted, not to its own members under close supervision, but to outsiders under little regulation. Even if the president is a former member of the congress, as seldom happens, that official is no longer in the assembly under supervision. The chief executive has rarely been a member of the legislature with the resulting knowledge of knowing how to coordinate with it, as was the case of Woodrow Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles. He usually lacks the years of service in high office in order that his ability may be known in advance. He seldom has the full background of governmental operation and events that comes only with service in it. He usually lacks the years of close association and personal acquaintance with many members of the congress which is needed before they will entrust him with power.

Because the congress does not have the systematic use of supervision, which keeps the administrative organization simplified and efficient, it cannot keep the executive's power concentrated and visible at the cabinet level. The breakdown in organization which started in 1917, and was at its worst during World War II, finally resulted in about 150 officials being directly responsible to the chief executive. It is little wonder that such an action occurred as, the building of the 70-million-dollar Pentagon building under a specific appropriation of 30 million dollars. The breakdown has gone so far that the congress can delegate power to the president, but cannot place responsibility below him when it is misused.

The congress is seldom fully informed on the background of the administration's actions, and its intentions and reasons for any particular policy. The president advises the congress of his actions, but never discusses them with that body except through its selected leaders. The cabinet members testify singly in committee hearings on various types of investigations and on pending legislation, but never discuss affairs with the legislature as a whole. Without the question-and-answer sessions, the congress is not kept well informed, and does not know fully, promptly, and at first hand, just what the executive branch is doing.

The president is, for all practical purposes, not removable from office, since it has never been accomplished as yet. Power, once delegated to him by a majority vote of the congress, cannot be removed from him except by a two-thirds vote over his veto, if he uses that instrument, and then only after about two weeks delay in clearing the legislation and the veto. The congress cannot set up the power desired, and then pick a man already trained for the post, but it must adjust the power to the official put into office by the people. Under

these most unfavorable conditions for the delegation of authority, the congress assigns power with hesitation, and the government can rarely develop strength to match that of dictatorships or of cabinet governments.

27.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN ACTION

The stable separation of powers in a government is possible only under reasonably democratic conditions. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and universal suffrage give the basis for an effective vote. Multi-party supervision of the elections gives all political organizations a fair chance to win, and prevents a one-party monopoly, such as exists in Liberia and Mexico. The right of every citizen to stand for office, without the governing party's leave, assures a strong congress. Only under these democratic conditions can an effective legislature carry out its duties and maintain the separation of powers in a government.

The result is a great reduction in the strength of the president or governor, and of the government. This weakness has plagued our national government during most of its career. But the weakness of the separation of powers stands out most prominently in our state and local units.

Since 1933, the federal government has taken over field after field of activity which had previously been regarded as matters to be handled by the state governments. Included are such phases as: regulation of electric-power companies, labor unions, stock exchanges, and some law enforcement. The national government has built up and expanded its powers until, in nearly every state in the Union, there are more federal employees than there are state employees. There remain few fields of action where the national government does not supervise all or a considerable part of their administration. It seems that we shall shortly be in the position where everything will be "ordered from Washington."

By many people this transfer of power to the federal government was regarded as merely a phase of the New Deal and an outright steal. But it was only possible because the state governments were too weak to keep their powers. Furthermore, it happened on such an extensive scale during the Thirties, only because the state governments were failing to handle major problems which the national

government must manage if our nation were to survive. A review of recent history will show where the state governments were failing.

The piracy of the business lords during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with the failure of the state governments to regulate them, is one of the important phases of American history. The growth of nearly all of the present-day giants in the business world was once unchecked by regulation. With the proper manipulation of influence, the railway barons could consider the state governments as parts of their business organizations. In the not so distant Twenties, the electric-power holding companies, led by Insull, developed without serious opposition from any source. Speculation ran wild, and burst in 1929, unchecked by effective regulation of the stock exchanges.

Millions of acres of cutover land and abandoned farmland needed to be reforested in order to check the runoff of water to the lowlands which resulted in frequent floods causing some deaths and the destruction of millions of dollars worth of property. Large areas of forestland in almost every state had already been taken over by the national government in order to prevent their wastage by lumber barons who were too strong for the state governments to control. Millions of acres more were taken over by the federal government in the Dust Bowl and in the marginal farmland areas over the country.

Dozens of lynchings took place because each prisoner was weakly defended by a sheriff and a handful of deputies who, although knowing that violence was impending, failed to transfer their prisoner to a larger jail for safety. In city after city, democratic government broke down, with party machines running their cities far into debt, and not giving the taxpayer his money's worth. In the Twenties, these organizations in the cities, along with the gangsters of the Prohibition period, made the crime situation so bad that it could be considered out of control.

The state governments were powerless to regulate any strong business firm or organization, or to handle any major problem. They were so ineffective in most fields of activity, that only where public opinion reacted strongly was there any effective action at all. In many important matters which demanded attention, there was little, if any, attempt to handle the state's affairs.

With disorder in many local matters, the situation became so critical by 1933 that the national government had to step into the void and provide needed regulation. Had this assumption of power over local concerns such as regulation of electric-power companies, labor unions,

and stock exchanges been an outright steal, the blame could have been placed on the national government. However, this was not the case, since the states were not using the power that was theirs. It was a case of action being absolutely necessary, and with the states being stalemated, the federal government was forced to expand into new fields of operation.

Now let us examine the organization of our states for the source of this tragic weakness. In them the governor is chosen by the people, and he remains directly responsible to them. The two houses of the state legislature are also elected by the people, and each one remains accountable to them. Since the two houses do not have to back a single cabinet, they may disagree freely with each other and with the governor. The result, when it comes to handling affairs of any kind, is action only when the three can agree on it. When they disagree, which they do frequently under the separation of powers, we have only inaction and stalemate. It is child's play for any big corporation or other group to influence a state government.

Despite the same type of organization, our national government has less difficulty in regulating the same business firms and other big organizations. This is due to its magnitude, and to the absolute necessity of handling all major problems and crises which occur if our nation is to survive. The state governments, however, face no such necessity of dealing with their affairs and can pass, and have frequently passed, the buck to the federal government.

In order to break the stalemate caused by the separation of powers, several states have adopted the initiative and referendum for enacting legislation. This is simply a provision for use when the three governmental authorities are stalemated on important measures and the people themselves must enact their own legislation. It is then possible for the people to govern themselves directly, in part, by initiating their own legislation and by holding a referendum to enact it, thus filling the void left by the inaction of the government. Like most substitutes, it does not work as well as the real thing.

Most of our municipal governments are also organized along the lines of presidential organization. The mayor-council units have a mayor and a council both elected by the people and each remains responsible to them. Only when the mayor and the council agree, do we have action. But, all too often, they disagree, and we do not receive effective municipal administration. Worst victims of these mayor-council organizations were the cities with bicameral councils which increased the stalemate in them. Most of the second chambers

have been eliminated because of the urgent need for better administration.

The gradual growth of the newer council-manager system in our cities and towns is more than a straw in the wind. These local governments are responsible ones. The people elect the members of the council, which in turn chooses the manager who remains responsible to that body. The mayor, who is usually chairman of the council, is the official head of the government but holds little power. The result is only one authority—the council, directly responsible to the people. It is small wonder that local governments, under the handicap of a mayor and a council in frequent and paralyzing stalemate, are being rapidly changed to this system of organization.

These council-manager governments form an interesting contrast to England's local ones. The latter carry committee rule even to these organizations, with the councils acting as the whole unit on policy matters, while administering affairs as committees. The one-man rule of a mayor or a manager is almost unknown. But American council-manager government, while becoming responsible, still carries out the habit of one-man rule in the office of the manager. A parallel development has been the use of city-wide election of councilmen under this form of organization, instead of the former method of election by wards. The party machines, by their activities, force this alteration on our only responsible governments.

In view of recent history and the trend of events, the state governments are declining rapidly as far as most affairs of importance are concerned. They are fading farther and farther into the background, and promise to become unimportant units of our system, as the county units have already become. The need for them lies in the fact that the more local affairs they can handle, the more time and effort the national government will have for duties which only it can manage. If the state governments are to remain a vital part of our political system, they will have to be reorganized so as to be able to handle all of the affairs reserved to them by the national Constitution.

28.

TOO MANY ELECTED AUTOCRATS

Due to France's experience in 1852 most nations in Europe do not attempt to elect a president by direct vote of the people. Of the 15 countries which have had republics at one time or another, only six

have used the popular vote to choose the chief executive. They included Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, and Portugal. Even those nations entrusted little authority to a president elected by the people. The power was administered by a cabinet committee responsible to the parliament.

Then in 1932, the people of Germany re-elected von Hindenburg to the presidency, only to see him yield power to Hitler a few months later. Still using this oft-failing practice in 1939 were Finland (through an electoral college) and Ireland. But now, after World War II, Austria and Iceland have blindly gone over to this faulty practice. Europe still has not accomplished a responsible president in all of her nations.

On Latin American nations has fallen the worst tragedy of the popular election of presidents and the separation of powers in government. The people's control of a chief executive's authority depends on a strong congress. But, lacking reasonably full democratic conditions, there is a weak legislature, unable to maintain its end of the separation of powers. Thus, under poor democratic conditions, an elected president achieves power far beyond that of a prime minister and cabinet under similar circumstances. In so-called backward countries, presidential government faces more pitfalls than cabinet government does.

With the president being nominated and elected outside the congress, ambitious men frequently get themselves elected to high office. Then, backed by the governmental machinery, the army, and the people who have elected him, he can over-balance the congress, also elected by the voters. He is not responsible to, nor under the supervision of, the legislature. In fact, with control of the election machinery, the chief executive usually provides an easily dominated congress. The natural result is that president after president goes beyond constitutional limits and assumes complete power.

The congress has no army or governmental machinery back of it, but stands alone. It has the usual handicaps of being divided into two chambers in most nations, and into two or more parties. The assembly has the difficulty of a body of 200 or more in taking concerted action. The congress has little chance to supervise the president's actions. It has no authority to see that only safe men hold the high office. Nor can the congress act quickly enough to remove a chief executive if he starts the moves toward assuming complete control. Little wonder that a congress fares poorly in any contest for power with a president elected by the voters.

The people unite solidly behind their leaders in wresting power from a king or a foreign power, but they find difficulty in backing their own congress to control their own president. They are not always careful to elect a man without ambition for power. If they make a mistake in selecting a president, they can only wait for the next election to replace him; but, by then, he frequently has assumed complete control, and can be removed only by assassination or by revolution. Little wonder that the people remain helpless when a president, chosen by their own votes, overpowers a congress, also chosen by themselves.

As one chief executive after another, following his election by the people, moves toward absolute power, he is faced by inadequate controls. The terms president and dictator have become synonymous in Latin America. After more than a century, few of their countries have developed a restrained strong president for more than a decade or two. A tabulation in March 1952 (a sample date) showed only 10 of the 20 Latin American nations with a president in office who had been chosen in a free and democratic election, and only Mexico had had this happy condition dating as far back as 1920.

Mexico has suffered the usual pattern of nearly one hundred revolutions in her career. As in nearly all Latin American countries, the constitution was changed in 1917 to deny the president the right to succeed himself in office. After a period of disorder, Obregon was elected in 1920, and began a period of orderly administration. Calles followed in 1924, had figureheads elected to replace himself after 1930, but remained in *de facto* power until 1934, when President Cardenas sent him into exile. Since then, elections have replaced chief executives on schedule. Though Mexico still has a strong president, he may not succeed himself, and thus his opportunity to become a lifetime dictator is reduced. But the opposition still may not serve its nation by regulating the governing party, nor may it win a presidential election. However, since 1920 Mexico has had a reasonably sound democracy, and stands high among Latin American countries in preventing elected autocrats from continuing in office after the next scheduled election.

From 1833 Chile had a reputation for stability, with orderly election and retirement of presidents. From the early days of her republic, she gradually developed cabinet government until she nearly achieved that complete organization, and used it from 1891 to 1925. But she never gave the prime minister the power to dissolve the congress when the cabinet had been defeated on a measure. Naturally,

cabinets fell frequently, as they still do in France. Worse, in 1874 and 1884, she adopted a system of proportional representation, and her parties began splitting up. Since then, Chile has lacked the strong parties required for stability under any method of organization. And, unlike the procedure assuring responsible government, she elected her presidents by vote of the people. The resulting system became even less stable than that of France, and improvements were strongly advocated.

Then Alessandri, president from 1920 to 1925, left a new constitution which ended cabinet government and brought back the strong president; and a period of disorder began. Figueroa, elected in 1925, was removed in 1926 by revolution. Ibanez became dictator of Chile. Upon his removal in 1931, by the same method, Montero was elected to the presidency, but his incumbency lasted only eight months. Following another revolution, Davilla assumed power, which lasted only 100 days. Alessandri was again chosen president in 1932. Since then, Chile has elected her presidents, but she still has trouble with the usual too many parties of proportional representation. And, finally, former dictator Ibanez was elected to the presidency by the people in 1952.

As a kingdom from 1824 to 1889, Brazil had cabinet government, but it was never well developed. When the king was dispensed with, the rudimentary system went also; it was replaced by a strong president. Brazil, due partly to her size, has had little trouble with nationwide civil disturbances. In 1930, as the result of a presidential election, occurred her first revolution under the republic. Prestes was elected, possibly fraudently, in the midst of a depression. The defeated candidate Vargas, as the result of a mild revolution, overthrew outgoing President de Souza and took office, in spite of his defeat at the polls. Not until 1945, did Brazil again return to democratic government. And, finally, former dictator Vargas was elected to the presidency by the people in 1950.

Argentina has had the usual Latin American experience with dictators, including Rosas from 1830 to 1851. More recently, Castillo, former vice-president, became chief executive from 1940 to 1943. Because of corruption in the administration, he was removed by a military junta. Soon thereafter, Peron came to power in 1946. With the usual dictator's trappings of a single permitted party, army, secret police, and censored press, he was Latin America's imitation Hitler or Mussolini until 1955. But why did not Argentina develop responsible government during the last century and a quarter?

Since 1903, Colombia has been a peaceful and fairly successful democracy. The Conservative party remained in power continuously from 1884 to 1930. Then the Liberals took office and operated the government for 16 years. Facing the election of 1946, they split into two factions. With two candidates in the contest, they lost to the Conservatives, the minority party. However, the Liberals could look forward to reuniting their party and winning the next election. But in 1950 the world learned that a civil war of repression against them had been going on for about two years. An estimated 50,000 lives had already been lost, and the Liberals could no longer look forward to winning the next election. A democracy had failed because it lacked a compromise cabinet to weather a serious party split. Attempting to elect a one-man executive had been disastrous. After a century as a democracy, where was the organization that would have permitted a temporary coalition cabinet which could have preserved her democratic government? Finally, in October 1953, Colombia changed to a more moderate Conservative-party president, and started settling down.

We have been accustomed to considering Europe as the scene of the worst bloodletting as Napoleon, Hitler, and others subverted their nations' men and resources for conquest. But it is to Paraguay that we must look for the worst example of an autocrat who sacrificed his people on the altar of ambition for power! In 1865 President Francisco Solano Lopez, acting to oppose a Brazilian sponsored revolution in Uruguay, invaded Brazil. He then sent his armies into Uruguay by crossing Argentina's territory, thereby adding that country to the war. For five years he pursued this useless war, largely against Brazil. When peace finally returned, out of Paraguay's population of 1,337,000, only 221,000 had survived! A Latin American nation had suffered more tragically than any other country in the world from the mental whims of an autocrat!

And still Latin America moves hardly at all to control these irresponsible presidents. They may not have the hereditary autocrats of old Europe, but they still have dictators anyway. The people may freely elect some of their presidents, but many of them still arrange their own rises to power and their own re-elections. Even Haiti, until recently using congressional election of the president, in 1950 held her first popular election for that office. Only Venezuela remains in all Latin America with congressional election of the chief executive, and even he is entrusted with power.

At least eight Latin American nations have used cabinet govern-

ment in various forms for a time. Cuba adopted the system in 1940. Ten countries require department heads to appear for questioning by their legislatures; and five nations permit them to speak in the assembly but do not allow them to vote. Only Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay still do not permit legislatures to supervise the administrators at all! The widespread supervision of department heads is bringing more efficient government to Latin American nations but as yet, it shows little sign of controlling the one-man executives. With the people electing two or three authorities in their governments, the president and in most countries two houses of the legislature, difficulties have remained in this beginning toward responsible organization. Latin America has made little use of Europe's painful experience in developing responsible government.

As England progressively cut down the power of the throne she steadily maintained the strength of her government. She built up parties powerful enough to take the throne's place. Cabinet government, as she knows it, is strongly organized party government. The prime minister, as majority party leader, governs effectively through an organization characterized by power and responsibility. The system retains the strength needed for success.

In 1787 the members of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia apparently thought all governments inherently too strong. This assumption was easy to make when viewing the monarchies of Europe. On the other hand, the members of the Convention had just observed the operation of their frail organization under the Articles of Confederation; but seeing its weaknesses, they did not fully comprehend the causes of its failure. They did not know that democratic government tends towards weakness inherently, and needs maximum strength in order to survive and to succeed. Cutting down its strength by the separation of powers brought a handicap to the United States, and made certain the repeated failures in Latin America.

The United Kingdom, the British Commonwealths, and the United States made the majority system and strong parties the base of their successful organizations. European countries started off using the second-ballot system, under which they developed parliamentary government, but failed, in most cases, to develop strong party government. Then in 1919, still regarding majority-party rule unjust, they sought to give minorities more representation. In the resulting use of proportionality, they organized without majority parties at all, with many failures resulting. Here again, history shows that democratic government tends towards weakness as a normal course of events. Operating without a governing majority party and a strong supervising minority one, as a result of proportional representation, was disastrous to many nations.

Some democracies have survived for decades. Many of them have failed after brief careers. We need to classify the successful ones, as to their development of strong party government and other essential mechanics which have given them the basis for survival. The importance of these fundamental principles of organization should then

become apparent. The basis of the successes and the causes for the failures should be clearly demonstrated by the records of performance.

In Group I we list the majority-party-ruled democracies in the world which were organized by 1923. Included in this group are: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of them only the latter elects a president by vote of the people, or uses the separation of powers. All the members of this group have two- or three-party systems controlling their governments.

In Group IA are the one-party democracies. Liberia has been ruled by one party since 1870, as has Mexico since 1920. The 1917 constitution of Mexico bars a president from succeeding himself. Both nations elect the chief executive by popular vote and use the separation of powers in their organizations. Both countries have yet to develop a strong opposition party and responsible government.

In Group II we list the minority-party coalition-ruled democracies which do not achieve the basic necessity of a majority party to operate their governments, but have survived in spite of the lack of it. In this group are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Of these nations; Finland, Iceland, Ireland, and Uruguay elect their presidents by vote of the people; Switzerland and Uruguay use a plural executive; and Uruguay uses the separation of powers. But all of this group use proportional representation and, as a result, fail to develop a majority party. Only Ireland, using a limited system of it, achieves a majority party at all, and that, only about half of the time.

In Group IIA are the European minority-party coalition-ruled democracies with previous failures. They include: Austria, West Germany, Greece, and Italy. Of this group, only Austria elects the president by vote of the people. But all of them still use proportional representation which failed to develop the strong parties needed to endure after World War I. With no majority party, usually, can they long survive the pull of Communist parties to the left and the growing extremist factions to the right? Will the weaknesses in organization that allowed Mussolini and Hitler to come to power be repeated and bring more failures in future years? Will Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, and the nine nations behind the Iron Curtain ever return to the role of democracies and redeem their failures?

In Group III we list the Latin American nations whose governments as of March 1952 (a sample date) were in office after elections clear

of serious irregularities. They include Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Salvador. With Mexico and Uruguay previously listed, the three groups include only 10 of the 20 Latin American countries. All of them use the separation of powers, and elect their chief executives by vote of the people. With the past records of strong presidents who have assumed autocratic power, this group is a very unstable one. Majority parties are present in some of these countries, but the strong opposition ones needed to regulate them are usually not organized. When will the ten missing nations join them, even if only temporarily, as democracies?

Most of the democracies in Asia and Africa seem to be organized according to the best practices as developed in England. Only Indonesia, Liberia, and the Philippines elect their chief executives by vote of the people. All others have hereditary rulers to head their nations, or elect presidents by their legislatures. Only Indonesia, Israel, and Japan use proportional representation to elect their parliaments; all others use the majority system. Only Liberia and the Philippines have presidential government with its separation of powers. All others use cabinet government and show promise of developing the strength needed to endure. Most of them should succeed if correct organization is maintained. But if many of them fail then Asia and Africa can be lost to the free world.

Of the 70-odd independent countries in the world today, barely a majority are operating democracies. With the past records of failures, the future of many of them does not appear bright. However, man has now had enough experience with popular government over the past two centuries so that he should be able to achieve the nearly shockproof democracy. Nations must adopt the best methods of organization developed to date, and avoid future failures. The penalty of more failures of democratic government may be another great war.

